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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) :
Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be
paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse,
and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance
carrier and not on the employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9)

(1993):

(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown,
from lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods
established for judicial review.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b):
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice
given thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the
act to be done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time
for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b),
(d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1)

Did the Board of Review correctly determine that Mr.

Judd's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment?
2)

Did the Industrial Commission err in permitting Mr. Judd

to file his Motion for Review one month late?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1)

The Board of Review's application of Utah Code Ann. Sec.

35-1-45 (1988) to the facts of this case is subject to correction
of error by this Court.

King v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 850

P.2d 1281, 1292 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(d) (1988).
2)

The Board of Review's decision to allow Mr. Judd an

extra month to file his Motion for Review is subject to an abuse
of discretion review.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b);

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) (1993).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AT ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL
1)

The first issue was raised at R. 86-182.

2)

The second issue was raised at R. 31-33.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Commercial Carriers employs Appellee Ronny Lynn
Judd as a truck driver.

(R. 19; Addendum 1).

In May 1992 Mr.

Judd and a co-employee, Mr. Coyle, were assigned to drive two
trucks loaded with new automobiles from Missouri to California.
(R. 19-2 0; Addendum 1).

Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle left Missouri the

morning of May 21 and stopped at Fort Kearney, Nebraska, for the
night.

(R. 20; Addendum 1 ) .

Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle arrived in Fort Kearney at approximately 6:30 p.m.

(R. 2, 50; Addendum 1).

Their driver's logs

indicate that they logged off work at this time; company policy
provided that drivers who logged off were not on duty and were
not under any responsibility to perform their employment
activities.

(R. 26; Addendum 1).

They registered at a motel,

parked their trucks next to each other in the parking lot, and
proceeded to the motel's lounge where they began consuming
alcohol.1

(R. 22; Addendum 1).

Although employees of Commercial

Carriers were not permitted to drink alcohol while on duty, they
could choose to drink while off duty.

(R. 12 8; Addendum 2 ) .

While at the lounge Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle noticed two
young men harassing two women.

(R. 22; Addendum 1).

Mr. Judd

*By the time they left the lounge, Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd
drank so much that Judge Allen found their judgment was "severely
impaired."
(R. 28; Addendum 1). Indeed, by the next morning,
Mr. Judd's blood alcohol level had dropped to .18, still more
than twice the legal limit in Utah. (R. 22; Addendum 1 ) .
-3-

realized that he knew the older of the two women and invited her
and her companion over to his table so they could avoid the two
harassing men.

(R. 22; Addendum 1 ) .

Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle

remained at the lounge with the two women until it closed at
midnight, then walked to the motel lobby with them.

(R. 23;

Addendum 1 ) .
The two young men appeared in the motel lobby a few minutes
later and asked Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle for the first time if they
could take one of the cars on their trucks for a joyride.
(R. 22-3; Addendum 1 ) .

Mr. Judd told them that they could not

and that all cars were equipped with alarms.
1).

(R. 23; Addendum

After conversing with the foursome, the two young men left

the lobby and walked out into the parking lot.

(R. 23; Addendum

1) .
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle walked the two women to their car in
the parking lot.

(R. 23; Addendum 1 ) .

After Mr. Judd engaged in

a kissing session with the older woman, the women drove off.
(R. 23; Addendum 1 ) .

Some minutes later, upon returning from a

convenience store down the road, Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle observed
the two young men wandering in a field adjacent to the parking
lot, then returning to the parking lot to walk around the cars
and trucks parked there.

(R. 23; Addendum 1 ) .

As the two young

men walked between Mr. Coyle's truck and another truck, Mr. Coyle
heard one of the men say that these must be the vehicles with the
alarms.

(R. 24; Addendum 1 ) .

Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle then
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credibility

^a ; - A . . e n
Judd a n d the
, :dendum 1)

Judge Allen discredited testimony to the effect that the assault
arose out of Mr. Judd's efforts to protect his truck and its
cargo from harm.

(R. 26; Addendum 1 ) .

Additionally, Judge Allen noted that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle
"had for all intents and purposes appointed themselves a parking
lot police department" when they warned the two young men to stay
away from all vehicles in the lot.

(R. 28; Addendum 1 ) .

Judge

Allen observed that by pursuing the two men into the field after
they tried to run away, Mr. Judd tried to take the law into his
own hands and "deviated completely" from any possible course and
scope of employment.

(R. 28; Addendum 1 ) .

Judge Allen further

noted that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle had logged off duty at 6:30
p.m., when they arrived in Fort Kearney.

Commercial Carriers'

Driver's Handbook states that off-duty employees were not responsible for performing work.
his own time.

Once Mr. Judd logged off, he was on

(R. 27; Addendum 1).

Accordingly, Judge Allen

denied Mr. Judd workmens' compensation benefits.
Although Mr. Judd had thirty days from the entry of Judge
Allen's order to file a Motion for Review with the Industrial
Commission, on the twenty-ninth day he filed what appeared to be
a request for an extension in which to file a Motion for Review.
Entitled "Motion for Continence[sic] for Response to Appeal," the
request asked for a thirty-day extension without offering any
explanation for the delay.

(R. 29; Addendum 3 ) .

Commercial

Carriers filed an objection to Mr. Judd's Motion for
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The Board next determined that Mr. Judd's injuries arose in
the course of his employment because Mr. Judd was "a truck driver
on assignment" and because he supposedly checked his truck some
time before the assault occurred.

(R. 54; Addendum 5 ) .

Although

the Board admitted that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle had arrived in
Fort Kearney at 6:30 p.m., it ignored Judge Allen's factual finding that they had logged off at this time and were thus off-duty.
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
Commercial Carriers accepts Judge Allen's findings of fact.
The Board adopted Judge Allen's findings with two notable exceptions.

First, the Board found that Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle had

checked their trucks some time before the fight began, but Judge
Allen made no finding to this effect.

(R. 52; Addendum 5 ) .

Second, the Board rejected Judge Allen's finding that the reason
for the fight was personal antagonism and substituted its own
inference that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to protect
his truck.
Since these two exceptions are the only factual finding that
Commercial Carriers disputes, Commercial Carriers ostensibly must
marshal evidence in support of them.

However, there is no evi-

dentiary basis in the record for the Board's finding that Mr.
Judd checked his truck.

Judge Allen did not make this finding in

his order, and Mr. Judd did not testify that he checked his truck
before going to the convenience store.
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(R. 110; Addendum 2 ) .
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it used to reach its inference, Commercial Carriers cannot marshal evidence in support of this inference.3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I;

In concluding that Mr. Judd's injuries arose out of his

employment, the Board of Review committed reversible error.
Primarily, the Board failed to support with substantial evidence
its assertion that the fight resulted from Mr. Judd's efforts to
protect his truck.

Additionally, the Board's suggestion that the

fight still would have arisen out of Mr. Judd's employment if the
fight was due to personal antagonism is legally insupportable.
The Board committed reversible error by concluding that the
fight arose in the course of Mr. Judd's employment, as well.

It

is undisputed that Mr. Judd was off-duty at the time of the
fight.
POINT II:

The Board abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Judd

to file an untimely Motion for Review because Mr. Judd did not
show cause for an extension to file as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(9) (1988) and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
6(b) .

Commercial Carriers argues below that this Court can reject
the Board's inference because it is not supported by substantial
evidence. Because the substantial evidence standard requires
this Court to examine the record as a whole, Commercial Carriers
will lay out below all subsidiary facts in the record that the
Board conceivably might have relied upon in reaching its
inference.
-10-

ARGUMENT
1 »OINT I
THE BOARD INCORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT MR. JUDD'S
TRIES AROSE OUT OF *-"~ T1kT THF, COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
A. The Board Erred In Concluding That The Injuries Arose
GuL of Mr. Judd's Employment.
1

BECAUSE THE BOARD FAILED TO EXPLAIN WHY ITREACHED ITS INFERENCE REGARDING THE CAUSE OF
THE FIGHT, THE INFERENCE IS UNSIJPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Aware of the tenet of workinens' ronipensai; i cn\ l.-iw
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Utah Code Ann. §
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4

Judge Allen characterizes the reason behind the fight as a
factual finding (R. 26) # but the Board terms the reason behind
the fight as an inference. (R. 53). The characterization is not
important, as the Board's inference is factual in nature and
constitutes a finding of fact.
11

evidence that both supports and detracts from the finding.

Grace

Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).
The only way to present evidence that might suggest the
fight arose over Mr. Judd's efforts to protect his truck is to
isolate the events that occurred after Mr. Judd left the motel
lounge, because this is the only time during the entire evening
that trucks were even mentioned.

The evidence from this snippet

of time indicates that the young men asked Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle
sometime after midnight if they could take one of the cars on the
trucks for a joyride.

(R. 23). Mr. Judd advised them that they

could not and that the cars had alarms.

(R. 23). Mr. Judd and

Mr. Coyle later observed the young men milling about the parking
lot where the trucks and several other vehicles were parked.
24).

(R.

When they approached Mr. Coyle's truck and remarked that

the cars had alarms Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle warned them to stay
away from their trucks and all other vehicles in the parking lot.
(R. 24).
On the other hand, if one considers the totality of the
evidence, as did Judge Allen, it is apparent that the fight arose
over personal antagonism that had been developing over the course
of the evening.

The evidence from the record as a whole esta-

blishes as an initial matter that Mr. Judd's testimony at the
hearing often contrasted sharply with his earlier deposition
testimony and could not withstand cross examination.

(R. 20-28).

Mr. Coyle's testimony at the hearing was also a different version
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of events from that contained in his police statement.
5)•

(R. 24-

Upon observing the demeanor and credibility of Mr. Judd and

Mr. Coyle at the hearing, Judge Allen had trouble believing Mr.
Judd's account that he had been trying to protect his truck from
vandalism.

(R. 26) .

Instead, Judge Allen drew from ample evidence in finding
that the fight resulted from personal antagonism between Mr. Judd
and Mr. Coyle and the young men.

Earlier in the evening Mr. Judd

and Mr. Coyle had whisked two women away from the unwanted attentions of the young men at the motel lounge.

(R. 22). They

stayed in the lounge from shortly after 6:30 p.m. until midnight,
when the lounge closed.

(R. 23). During this time Mr. Judd had

consumed so much alcohol that his blood alcohol level was high
enough to have dropped to .18 by the next morning. (R. 27).
While socializing with the two women in the motel lobby
after midnight, the two younger men approached the foursome and
engaged in conversation.

(R. 23). Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle then

walked the women to their car, and after Mr. Judd spent some time
kissing the older woman, the women drove away.

(R. 23). Soon

afterwards, Mr. Judd rode the crest of his alcohol-enhanced wave
of machoism by warning the young men to stay away from all
vehicles in the parking lot.

(R. 24). The young men ran away

because they had been "scared pretty good."

(R. 25, 28).

Because the young men were no longer near the trucks, any
supposed goal of protecting the trucks from harm had been
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achieved at this point.
in mind.

However, Mr. Judd had a loftier purpose

Still imbued with the sense of chivalry he had received

earlier in the evening when he rescued the two maidens at the
lounge, Mr. Judd had dreams of routing the villains.
them into the field until he caught up with them.

He pursued

(R. 25). The

tide turned when his injuries ensued.
Viewing the record as a whole, there is paltry evidence that
might support a finding that the fight arose over Mr. Judd's
efforts to protect his truck.

Since it is unclear whether the

Board even relied on this paltry evidence in reaching its
inference, the argument that the inference was not supported by
substantial evidence becomes stronger.

See Burns Bros., Inc. v.

Employment Div.. 784 P.2d 117, 118 (Or. App. 1989) (when agency
board fails to explain reason for implicitly disagreeing with
referee's determination of credibility, impossible to determine
if board's finding based on substantial evidence); Intern. Bro.
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs v. N.L.R.B., 587 F.2d 1176, 1180-1 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (agency board cannot merely state that it disagrees
with ALJ but must set forth basis of its disagreement so that
reviewing court can check for substantial evidence) (Addendum 6 ) .
By contrast, Judge Allen found that the fight resulted from
personal antagonism after observing the demeanor and credibility
of Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle at the hearing.

His subsidiary factual

findings support this inference, for they describe a long evening
of wooing women, drinking alcohol, and chasing men.
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Because

there is substantial evidence to support Judge Allen's finding,
Commercial Carriers requests this Court to reinstate it.
2.

CONTRARY TO THE BOARD'S ASSERTION, A FIGHT
FOR PERSONAL REASONS WOULD NOT ARISE OUT OF
MR. JUDD'S EMPLOYMENT.

Perhaps realizing the shakiness of its inference, the Board
maintained that even if the ALJ's inference were true, "the
beating was still 'closely entangled' with the work."
Addendum 5 ) .

(R. 54;

Nevertheless, the insinuation that an employer can

somehow be forced to pay for employees' reckless displays of
machoism contradicts workers' compensation law.
It has long been the rule in Utah that fights involving
personal matters do not arise out of one's employment.

Wilkerson

v. Industrial Comm'n.. 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270 (1928) (injuries
from fight over cows between employee and neighbor at workplace
not compensable) (Addendum 7); Garff v. Industrial Comm'n., 247
P. 495 (1926) (injury inflicted upon sheriff by willful act of
third person growing out of personal matters did not arise out of
employment) (Addendum 8).

If an assault on an employee is per-

sonally motivated and not exacerbated by employment, the employment simply does not cause the injuries for purposes of workers'
compensation law.
The Board erroneously interpreted the "arising out of"
language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 to apply to personal
altercations.

Judge Allen correctly construed the statute and

concluded that Mr. Judd's injuries from a personal fight were not

-15-

compensable.

This Court can correct the Board's error by rein-

stating Judge Allen's Order.
B. The Board Erred In Concluding That Mr. Judd's Injuries
Arose In The Course Of His Employment.
The Board noted in its decision that for an injury to arise
in the course of one's employment, it must fall within the time,
space and work-related boundaries of the employment.
Addendum 5 ) .

(R. 54;

Although it properly stated the law, the Board

incorrectly applied the facts of the case to this law.
In maintaining that Mr. Judd's injuries fell within the
time, space and work-related boundaries of his employment, the
Board noted that Mr. Judd happened to be a truck driver on
assignment when he got into the fight.

The Board also admitted

that Mr. Judd's socializing earlier in the evening amounted to a
personal deviation from his work.

(R. 54; Addendum 5 ) .

The mere

fact that an employee is injured while on assignment is insufficient to place the injury within the course of employment when
the employee takes a personal deviation from work.

In Dale v.

Trade Street, Inc., 854 P.2d 828 (Mont. 1993), a truck driver on
assignment was injured during a six-hour visit with his brother,
during which time he consumed alcohol.

Observing that travelling

employees are not covered twenty-four hours a day regardless of
the conduct in which they engage, the court denied benefits on
the ground that the truck driver's visit constituted a personal
deviation from his employment.

Id. at 832.
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The only other factual basis to which the Board refers for
its conclusion that Mr. Judd's injuries arose in the course of
his employment is that Mr. Judd checked his truck in the parking
lot some time before the fight began.

(R. 52, 54; Addendum 5 ) .

As previously pointed out, there is absolutely no evidence in the
record that Mr. Judd checked his truck before going to the
convenience store.

Since Mr. Judd deviated from his employment

with his night-long drinking and socializing, his injuries did
not arise in the course of his employment as a matter of law.5
The Board's conclusion to the contrary is erroneous.
By contrast, Judge Allen's assertion that Mr. Judd was not
in the course of his employment because he was off-duty and not
responsible for performing work constitutes a correct application
of worker's compensation law.

Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. of

Utah, 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993) (injury bartender sustained
when beer keg fell on foot not in course of employment; shift had
ended five to six hours prior to injury); Auerbach Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n., 195 P.2d 245 (Utah 1948) (Wolfe, concurring)
(where employee participated in employer-sponsored sport during
off-duty hours, injury did not arise in course of employment).

5

In fact, even if the Board's inference that the fight was
caused by work-related activities were supported by substantial
evidence, Mr. Judd still deviated from his course of employment
by violating company regulations instructing employees to call
the police and not to pursue vandals. M & K Corp. v. Industrial
comm'n, 189 P.2d 132 (1948) (violations by employee of company
regulations at the time of accident constitutes departure from
course of employment).
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Upon scrutinizing the Board's decision, it is apparent that
the Board incorrectly applied Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 to the
supportable facts of this case.

Primarily, the Board's con-

clusion that the fight was caused by work-related activities is
erroneous; its finding that the fight resulted from efforts to
protect the truck lacks substantial evidence, and its suggestion
that the fight still would have arisen out of Mr. Judd's
employment if it resulted from personal antagonism has no basis
in the law.

Because the Board erroneously interpreted the

"arising out of" requirement, this Court can reinstate Judge
Allen's Order on this basis alone.

The Board also erred in

interpreting the "arising in the course of" language, providing
an alternate basis for the Court to reinstate Judge Allen's
order.

Commercial Carriers requests that this Court remedy the

Board's errors by adopting Judge Allen's decision.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
PERMITTING MR. JUDD TO SUBMIT AN UNTIMELY
MOTION FOR REVIEW WITHOUT SHOWING CAUSE.
The day before the deadline established by Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-12(l)(a) to file a Motion for Review, Mr. Judd requested
an extension of time.

His request failed to explain why he

needed the extension.

Over Commercial Carrier's objections, the

Commission granted Mr. Judd a one-month extension.

Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 6(b) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(9)
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require a party requesting an extension of time to file a motion
to show good cause why the agency should grant the extension.

In

perfunctorily granting Mr. Judd's request without heeding Rule
6(b) and § 63-46b-l(9), the Board abused its discretion.
This Court can nullify an agency action if it runs contrary
to the agency's prior practice.
16(4) (iii) .

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

In Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n.,

860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993), this Court presided over a case
where the Industrial Commission had exercised its practice of
denying an extension of time to file a motion for review because
the party failed to show good cause.

The petitioner in Maverick

had only asked for a one-day extension of time in which to file
the motion, but the Commission stressed that the failure to show
good cause was fatal. Id. at 950.

The Commission's contrary act

in this area of granting a thirty-day extension in spite of
failure to show good cause runs counter to prior agency practice
and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

This unwarranted

extension prejudiced Commercial Carriers because the Board
ultimately granted Mr. Judd's Motion for Review.

Accordingly,

this Court should nullify Mr. Judd's untimely-filed Motion for
Review and the Board's ensuing Order Granting the Motion for
Review.
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CONCLUSION
The Board's decision granting Mr. Judd workmen's compensation benefits contains several short comings.

The Board

rejected a key factual finding entered by Judge Allen based upon
his observation of the witnesses' credibility, then substituted a
contrary factual finding without explanation or support for the
finding.

It asserted the legally insupportable proposition that

a personal altercation is caused by one's employment.

It main-

tained that Mr. Judd was in the course of his employment when he
sustained his injuries even though he had logged off work hours
before.

Finally, the Commission arbitrarily permitted Mr. Judd

an extension to file his Motion for Review without requiring Mr.
Judd to follow the rules with which all other petitioners must
comply.
For the above reasons, Appellant Commercial Carriers
requests that this Court reverse the Board's Order and deny
Appellee benefits.
DATED this o ? ^ day of July, 1994.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

P. <*—
Anne Swensen
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellants

A—
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ADDENDUM 1:
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

RONNY LYN JUDD,
Applicant,
vs.
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS and/or
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

92-1401

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 29,
1993, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law'
Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and
Davis, Attorney at Law.

represented

by

Bryan

Defendants were represented by Anne Swenson,
Attorney at Law.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge.
Being
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is
prepared to enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
This case involves the issue of whether or not the applicant
sustained a compensable industrial accident on or about May 21,
1992, while employed by Commercial Carriers. The applicant was
called and testified that he started working for Commercial
Carriers as a transport truck driver in 1980. Commercial Carriers
is engaged solely in the business of transporting new and used
automobiles to various locations across the country. The applicant
was dispatched out of the Clearfield terminal.
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In late May of 1992, the applicant and three other drivers
were flown to Chicago for the purpose of delivering cars in the
Illinois area. On or about May 20, 1992, the applicant and a coworker, Mr. Coyle, were instructed to report to Wentzville,
Missouri, from whence they were each to drive a load of new
Pontiacs to Burlingame, California. They arrived in Wentzville on
May 20, 1992, but by the time they got their cars loaded and ready
to go, it had already taken nine hours that day. At that time,
they decided that they would get some rest and start out the next
morning for the San Francisco area. The applicant and Mr. Coyle
left Wentzville at 8:30 a.m., and according to both of their
driver's logs, they arrived there at 6:30 p.m.. However, the
applicant testified that they actually arrived at 10:30 p.m.. The
applicant testified that the discrepancy on his driver's log sheet
was owing to the fact that his father had completed the log for
him, and he, the applicant, had not caught the mistake according to
his deposition testimony. At his deposition, the applicant was
also asked relative to the information on his driver's log for May
21, 1992, the following: "How did your father get the information
to fill this out? A: From the other driver, Jim Coyle. Q: And
was Coyle just mistaken about the hours? A: Yes." The applicant
went on to explain that he was incapacitated, and had his father
fill out the log sheet for him.
The applicant went on to testify that they were allowed to
drive 540 miles per ten hour period. The applicant indicated that
based on that rule, they drove until they reached Fort Kearney,
Nebraska, which was 535 miles from Wentzville, Missouri.
The
applicant testified that they were averaging 52 miles per hour, on
the trip. The applicant was asked why it would have taken he and
Mr. Coyle fourteen hours to reach Fort Kearney, and the applicant
explained that they had stopped for meals and truck checks, and
because of weather conditions. However, neither the applicant nor
his witness offered any examples of locations where the weather
was, in fact, bad. Further, the applicant was unable to explain
why the meal breaks that he took were not reflected on either his
driver's log or Mr. Coyle's driver log as required by ICC and
company regulations.
The applicant testified that they receive an approved list of
hotels, and that the Fort Kearney Inn was one of the approved
hotels.
They checked into the motel upon their arrival, and
thereafter, washed up and went to a motel tavern. The applicant
testified on. direct examination that he had a drink, however, on
cross-examination, the applicant allowed that he and Mr. Coyle had
split a pitcher of beer. The applicant also testified that he had
a shot of tequila.
The applicant's medical records from Good
Samaritan Hospital, however, indicates that when the applicant was
seen at that facility later that evening, he had a blood alcohol
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level of .18. The applicant also testified that Mr. Coyle helped
him with the pitcher of beer, and also had two Bloody Marys. The
applicant and Mr. Coyle were seated at a table in the bar, when
they noticed two women sitting at a table next to them. One of the
women was in her forties, while the other was in her twenties. The
younger woman was being hassled or harassed by two younger men.
The applicant testified that the two men had been walking up and
asking the women to dance, and that the women did not seem to like
the idea. Sometime during that process, the applicant and the
older woman determined that they had previously met in Grand
Island, Nebraska, approximately five years prior. The applicant
stated "They decided to come over and sit with us so they could
avoid the two guys." According to Mr. Judd's further deposition
testimony, the women were approached twice by the two young men
before they came over and sat at his and Coyle's table.
The applicant, as part of his effort to rescue the women from
the unwanted attentions of the two younger men, invited the women
over to their table. After they had been invited over, the two men
went by the table and made some short comments to the younger
woman. The applicant and his table companions continued with their
socializing, and at this point, the evidence becomes disputed. The
applicant and Mr. Coyle testified at the time of the evidentiary
hearing that the two men came over to the table later and engaged
them in general chitchat conversation relative to what they were
doing in town, and whether or not they could take one of the cars
for a joyride. However, Mr. Judd's deposition testimony of October
1992, directly contradicts the testimonial evidence of Mr. Judd and
his witness. In his deposition, on page 29, the following exchange
took place between the applicant and defense counsel:
Q: And you say they did not come over to your
table after the two women came and sat with
you?
A: No.
Q: Did they make any comments to either you or Mr. Coyle?
A: After we had walked out of the bar, yes, they did.
Q: So until you had walked out of the bar, you never
exchanged any words at all with these two men?
A: Not that I can recall.
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Having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
applicant and Mr- Coyle, I find that the applicant's deposition
testimony is more credible, and accordingly, I give it more weight*
The applicant and his companions stayed at the bar until
closing, which was apparently at midnight. The applicant and his
companions left the bar, and were milling around in the lobby of
the motel.
According to the applicant, they then talked for
approximately five or ten minutes, and while they were talking,
they were approached by the two younger men.
The applicant
testified that at that time, they asked about what Coyle and Judd
did for a living, and also inquired as to whether or not they could
take one of the cars for a drive "Up and down main street. . .".
The applicant informed the men that was not permissible, and that
the cars all had alarms on them. The applicant testified that that
portion of the conversation terminated, and that the younger men
were also talking with the younger woman. The applicant testified
that after informing the younger man that they could not have a
joyride, that the two younger men then walked out into the parking
lot. The applicant and Mr.Coyle and the women also walked out to
the parking lot, and the applicant testified that he spent another
five or ten minutes talking to the older woman, and after giving
her a big kiss, she and the other woman left on their way back home
to Grand Island.
After the women left, the applicant and Mr. Coyle started to
walk back towards the motel, when the two men from the bar
approached them and asked if they would like to drink a cold pack
of beer with them at their room. Mr. Coyle declined, informing
them that he did not think that was a good idea since they had to
get up early the next morning and head out. Thereafter, Coyle and
Judd went over to a Standard station, which had a convenience
store, to get some pop and cigarettes.
Unfortunately, the
convenience store was closed, and so, Coyle and Judd decided to
return to the motel lobby, to obtain those items. At this point,
the versions of the events that transpired next differ.
The
applicant at the hearing, testified that as he was coming back from
the convenience store, he saw that both of the younger men from the
bar were on his truck, and it appeared that one of them was trying
to kick in the window on one of the cars. Since the applicant
stated that the cars were his responsibility until delivery was
made, he felt the need to tell these men to get off his truck. The
applicant then testified that the men got off the truck, and one of
the men then took a swing at him and hit him in the face, and the
next thing he remembered was waking up with Coyle and the doctors
trying to hold him down to take a CT scan.
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Mr. Coyle in a statement to the police, had a different
version of the events that transpired after the return from the
closed Standard station. Quoting from the police report:
Coyle advised, at this time, he observed the
male subjects walk along the side of the motel
on the south side to the west. He said the
subjects walked about 25 to 3 0 yards into the
field located just directly west of Fort
Kerney Inn and then they walked around a
wooden building out in that field.
Coyle
advised he then had himself and Judd go over
by their trucks to watch the subjects. He
advised they stood in the shadow of their
trucks for approximately 5 - 1 0
minutes,
waiting to see where the two male subjects
went to.
Coyle advised, a short time later,
the male subjects came back down in front of
the motel and started walking in and out of
the vehicles located inside the parking lot.
Coyle said the subjects then walked around all
the trucks that were parked in the parking lot
and then they walked down through the middle
of the trucks. Coyle said the subjects then
walked up between his truck and what he
thought was a tanker truck setting next to
his. He said, at this time, he heard one male
subject tell the other one that this must be
the vehicles with the alarms. Coyle advised
this officer earlier when they were talking
inside the bar, Judd told the subjects to stay
away from the vehicles because they all have
alarms on them. Coyle advised he thought one
of the male subjects then jumped onto the
truck. Coyle advised, after the subject got
down off his truck, he came out of the shadow
of the trucks and confronted the two subjects.
He advised he told the two subjects he didn't
want them around their trucks. Coyle advised,
at this time, they walked approximately 25 to
3 0 yards into the field just south of their
trucks, talking to the two subjects. Coyle
advised that he was telling the subjects that
they would appreciate it if they would just
stay away from their trucks and all the other
trucks that were in the lot.
On cross-examination, the applicant relented from his prior
testimony, which seemed to leave the impression that the applicant
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was struck right near the rear of the truck, and instead, the
applicant admitted that the two younger men ran to an irrigation
ditch, that was some 2 5 - 3 0 yards away across the field, and that
he and Coyle pursued the would be vandals. In his deposition, the
applicant stated as follows: "Yes. We followed them to make sure
that they were either going to head away from the trucks or just
get in the car and get out of there, was what we were hoping." The
applicant testified further that he and Coyle were not running, but
that the two younger men were running. He stated: "We had scared
them, I guess, plenty good enough, because when they got down off
the truck, they were runnin". The applicant testified that the men
kept running until they reached the irrigation ditch, at which
point , they stopped and turned around. The applicant and Mr.
Coyle then approached the two younger men, and after Mr. Coyle said
something, one of the younger men took a swing at the applicant and
struck him in the face, causing the injuries that the applicant now
complains of.
Although the applicant testified that one of the men was
kicking his car, it is interesting to note that at the very time of
the incident itself, Mr. Coyle made no mention to police that one
of these men was kicking the windows of one of the cars. It should
also be noted, that while the applicant testified that it was his
truck that the young men had climbed onto, Mr. Coyle testified that
it was his truck.
In addition, Mr. Coyle in describing the
incident stated ". . . H e thought one of the male subjects then
jumped onto the truck." Faced with this variance, I find that the
version of the incident given by Mr. Coyle to the reporting officer
would be more reliable than the later version that is now being
claimed.
Having set forth the factual variances and findings in this
matter, those facts must now be applied to the legal requirements
of the Act. Section 35-1-45, of the Utah Workers Compensation Act
provides that compensation shall be paid to any employee who is
injured: ". . . B y accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment. . .". As articulated by Professor Larson, in his
Treatise On Workers Compensation, "The 'arising out o f test is
primarily concerned with causal connection." Larson's Workmens
Compensation Law, Section 6.00. Larson goes on to indicate in
Section 14.00 that:
The course of employment requirement tests
work-connection, as to time, place and
activity; that is, it demands that the injury
be shown to have arisen within the time and
space boundaries of the employment, and in the
course of an activity whose purpose is related
to the employment.
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Addressing the first statutory requirement of "arising out
of", requires a discussion of the causation aspect of the
applicant's injury.
The applicant, by and through counsel,
contends that the beating he suffered at the hands of the younger
men arose out of his employment as a transport truck driver with
Commercial Carriers, The applicant's theory being that but for his
attempts to protect the load and his truck from vandalism, he would
not have been hurt. However, that theory presupposes that the
applicant's injury did, in fact, arise out of his desire to prevent
vandalism from occurring. I do not believe that the assault in
this matter did, in fact, arise out of the applicant's efforts to
protect his truck and its cargo from harm. Rather, I find that the
assault arose out of a dispute between the applicant and his coworker and the younger men they encountered in the bar earlier that
evening.
The applicant and Mr. Coyle testified that they arrived in
Fort Kearney at 10:00 - 10:30 p.m., on the evening of May 21, 1992.
Although their driver's logs clearly indicate they arrived four
hours earlier at 6:30 p.m..
Initially, the Administrative Law
Judge believed the applicant's testimony that because of the
confusion surrounding his injury and the seriousness of his
injuries, that he had, through an oversight, failed to catch the
error which had been made on his driver's log by his father. The
reader may recall that the applicant also testified at his
deposition that the information for his driver's log entry of May
21, 1992, was taken by his father from information furnished to him
by the applicant's co-worker, Mr. Coyle. At first blush, the
Administrative Law Judge was not overly concerned with that
discrepancy, and was prepared to let it pass unnoticed. However,
after further reflection and review of all of the records contained
on this file, I now find that driver's log discrepancy is of major
importance.
While it was understandable that the applicant's
driver's log would contain an error, since his father, a nondriver
had filled it out, it cannot be said that Mr. Judd's father also
filled out Mr. Coyle's driver's log for May 21, 1992. Mr. Coyle,
when asked directly why his log contained that discrepancy, gave a
truly incredible answer.
He indicated that he had mistakenly
filled out his log because he feared for his personal safety. That
explanation, just does not ring true, and can only be the product
of a fraudulent attempt to hide the true facts of this matter.
In this regard, the applicant testified that he had only
consumed half of a pitcher of beer and one shot of tequila, and
yet, based on that consumption, the applicant would have us believe
that as a result of those drinks, his blood alcohol content ended
up at .18, more than twice the legal limit in Utah. That the
applicant's blood alcohol content was as high as it was, over two
hours after he had last consumed his last drink, can only mean that
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at the time the applicant left the Fort Kearney Inn, in fact, his
blood alcohol level was even higher than the .18, he tested at the
Good Samaritan Hospital in Fort Kerney, Nebraska. That leads the
Administrative Law Judge to conclude that the applicant had
consumed far more alcohol than he testified to at the evidentiary
hearing. If that discrepancy in the amount of alcohol is coupled
with the time discrepancy with respect to when the applicant
arrived in Fort Kearney, it can only lead to one conclusion in my
opinion, and that is that the applicant and Mr. Coyle did, in fact,
arrive in Fort Kearney much earlier than the 10:30 p.m. time frame
they would have us believe.
Thus, it would appear to the
Administrative Law Judge that rather than merely having a few
drinks at the bar, in fact, Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd had numerous
drinks, and, in fact, had spent quite a significantly longer period
of time there drinking. Unfortunately, as the result of their
intoxication, which they both were, their judgment in this
situation was severely impaired.
It will also be recalled by the reader, that the applicant had
testified that after the bar had closed, he spent no more than
approximately 25 or 3 0 minutes with the women in the lobby and
parking lot, and thereafter, the altercation ensued and he was
injured. However, a close review of the police incident report
belies that assertion. The police report indicates that incident
occurred and the police were called at approximately 1:57 a.m. on
the morning of May 22, 1992. When asked on cross-examination, how
he could explain his activities for the approximate one and onehalf hours that elapsed between when the women left and when he was
assaulted, the applicant had no credible or viable explanation.
Thus, I can only conclude that more transpired than teither Mr.
Coyle or Mr. Judd is willing to testify to.
A further difficulty with the applicant's claim, is his
contention that the would be vandal was kicking the windows out of
his vehicle. If, in fact, the applicant did observe that activity
occurring, he should have gone into the lobby of the motel and
called the police. The applicant was not required, by any stretch
of the imagination, to personally take care of police matters
himself. The Driver's Handbook, which was admitted into evidence,
specifically indicates: "Off duty: When the driver is not on
duty, he is not required to be ready for duty or is not under any
responsibility for performing work." As indicated previously, the
applicant's driver's log and Mr. Coyles driver's log for May 21,
1992, clearly indicate that both of those gentlemen were off duty
as of 6:30 p.m.. Therefore, from that point on, the applicant and
Mr. Coyle. were on their own time, and could do whatever activities
they wanted. The file indicates that they did engage in social
activities that evening, and they also engaged in some serious
consumption of alcoholic beverages.
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The report that Mr, Coyle made to the police officer is very
enlightening. As may be recalled, Mr. Coyle thought he saw one of
the men on his truck, and that after they got off, and he yelled at
them, they ran into a field toget away from the applicant and Mr.
Coyle, having been "scared pretty good" by them. At that point,
Mr. Coyle and the applicant should have gone to the lobby of the
motel and called the police, if they felt that there was any
further danger to their vehicle or to their cargo. However, that
is not what transpired. Rather, based on the remarks made by Mr.
Coyle as reflected in the police report, it would appear that Mr.
Coyle and the applicant basically engaged in "tough talk" to the
two younger men. Specifically, Mr. Coyle not only told the younger
men that they should stay away from he and Mr. Judd's truck, but
also told them to stay away from all the trucks in the parking lot.
There being no evidence that Mr. Coyle had been deputized by the
Fort Kearney Police Department, it is unclear where he derived such
authority under these circumstances.
It can only be concluded that Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd had for
all intents and purposes appointed themselves a parking lot police
department. When the tenor of Mr. Coyle's comments to the men are
considered, in light of their prior dealings earlier that evening
in the bar, it would appear reasonable to the Administrative Law
Judge to conclude that there was some antagonism between the
applicant and Mr. Coyle and those two younger men. Although Mr.
Coyle and Mr. Judd tried to downplay any friction, it would appear
that Mr. Coyle and Mr. Judd served as "knights in shining armor"
and rescued the two women from the unwanted attentions of those two
younger men. To say that the relations between Coyle and Judd and
those two younger men from that point on were somehow on a friendly
basis, is to deny human nature. In addition, sight should not be
lost of the fact that both Mr. Coyle and the applicant were very
intoxicated on the evening of May 21, 1992, and it would be assumed
that they and the two younger men were competing for the attention
of the two women. As indicated previously, this intoxication
ultimately led to the injuries sustained by the applicant in this
case. In other words, had the applicant not been very intoxicated,
he and Coyle both, would not have had their judgment impaired, such
that they would have felt the need to take the law into their own
hands.
As indicated previously, they had no duty to do so.
Further, once the would be vandals were off the truck, if, in fact,
they were on the truck at all, which seems in doubt considering the
level of intoxication present in this case; regardless, once those
would be vandals left the truck and were running away from the
scene of the "crime", any further activity on the part of Coyle and
Judd was beyond the scope of reasonable conduct. Coyle and Judd
had no duty to pursue those would be vandals, and in so doing so,
they deviated completely from any possible course and scope that
they might have had with respect to their employment.

•n x\n
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The injury sustained by Ronny Lyn Judd on May 21, 1992, did
not arise out of and in the course of his employment with
Commercial Carriers.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the workers compensation claim of
Ronny Lyn Judd, alleging a compensable industrial accident on May
21, 1992, should be, and the same is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

Certified this day of
May, 1993.
ATTEST:

the
the
and
not

ADDENDUM 2:
CITED PAGES FROM HEARING TRANSCRIPT

1

minutes later closed down, you went out to say your good

2

nights to this gal you previously knew?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

How long were you in the parking lot?

5

A.

Ten minutes, 15 minutes.

6

Q.

And then she left?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Do you know where she went?

9

A.

They told us that both of them lived in

10

Grand Island, Nebraska.

11

Q.

Then what happened?

12

A.

They left, and then we walked back into the

13

lobby for a minute and then decided, well, let's go get

14

a soda pop over at the convenience store. Along the way

15

over there —

16

Q.

How far was the convenience store?

17

A.

—

it was on the way over there or on the

18

way back, we saw these same guys that we had met in the

19

bar trying to climb on one of the trucks. And it looked

20

to me like they were trying to kick one of the windows

21

out of one of the cars.

22

Q.

So what did you do?

23

A.

We tried to chase them off. And when they

24

got onto the ground about the only thing I really

25

remember after that is I got hit real hard.

The next
24
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And there was a streetlight in close

3

proximity to your trucks; is that correct?

4
5

A.

There was a streetlight on the other side of

the two trucks, closer to the motel.

6

Q.

And you drew that streetlight on a diagram

7

at the time of your deposition and it's attached to your

8

deposition; is that correct?

9

A.

Yes, as far as I could recall that is.

10

Q.

What instructions have you been given by

11

Commercial Carriers in the event that your cargo or your

12

truck is vandalized?

What are you supposed to do?

13

A.

Report it to the sheriffs.

14

Q.

That's the first thing?

15

A.

Sheriff or city police, wherever we happen

16
17
18

to be.
Q.

That is the first thing you do.

Then what

do you do after that?

19

A.

I contact the company.

20

Q.

What does the company do?

21

A.

The company follows up apparently on the

22

police reports.

23

Q.

Do they ever send out an investigator?

24

A.

Not to my knowledge.

25

Q.

Have you ever been in a situation where your
46
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for the company.
Q.

What does Commercial Carriers require of a

driver when he is off duty in terms of protecting his
cargo?
A.

When he's off duty, when he goes off duty,

are you referring to at night or during the day?
Q.

Well, I'm referring to at night or if he

takes an hour lunch break or —
A.

After he has done his tour of duty that day

he secures his truck, checks his truck, he's off duty,
he can pursue his own activities.
Q.

Do you require him to park the truck in a

safe place?
A.

The safest place possible, yes.

Q.

Do you require your drivers to sleep with

the truck?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you require the drivers to keep the truck

within their view when they're off duty?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you hold drivers responsible for

vandalism to the trucks or the cargo when they're off
duty?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever or has Commercial Carriers
79
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ever trained or instructed drivers to pursue vandals?
A.

No, we have not.

Q.

What do you instruct drivers to do if

there's vandalism to their trucks or cargo?
A.

They are instructed to call the police, get

ahold of the company and they will take it from there.
Q.

Are drivers disciplined or reprimanded if

there is damage to their cargo, say, as a result of
their negligent driving like driving into an overpass or
backing into another vehicle?
A.

Yes,, they are.

Q.

In a circumstance such as this if —

had

this incident been investigated, and I assume it was,
and the vehicles were parked at an approved motel in the
safest place possible and either the trucks or the cargo
on the trucks had been vandalized, would either driver
have been reprimanded or disciplined in any way?
A.

No.

Q.

What are the drivers instructed to do if

they find someone messing with their trucks or their
cargo?
A.

I don't believe that we have ever instructed

them of what to do.
MS. SWENSEN:
THE COURT:

I don't have anything further.

Cross?
80

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

ADDENDUM 3:
MOTION FOR CONTINENCE FOR RESPONSE TO APPEAL

COPY

Bryan B. Davis 5600
Attorney for Applicant Judd
3587 West 4700 South
Salt lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone 969-8811
Fax 965-6400

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

RONNY L. JUDD,
Applicant,

MOTION FOR CONTINENCE

vs

FOR RESPONSE TO APPEAL

COMMERCIAL CARRIERS INC.
and OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE CO.,
DEFENDANTS.

ALJ :ALLEN
Case No. 92-1401

Comes now the Applicant, Ronny L. Judd by and through counsel
of record Bryan B. Davis, and hereby moves for a thirty (3 0) day
extension to file a response for reconsideration and supporting
memorandum in the ruling by judge Allen in the above entitled case.

Respectfully submitted this the

day June of 1993.

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I caused to be faxed and mailed postage
prepaid to the Indus-trial Commission State of Utah at (801) 5306804 and maiAe'd to the\ Industrial Commission located at 160 East
300 Soutpij f.O. Box 510250 Salt lake City, Utah 84151-0250

ADDENDUM 4:
OBJECTION TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINENCE
[SIC] FOR RESPONSE TO APPEAL

ANNE SWENSEN [A4252]
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF UTAH

RONNY JUDD,
Applicant,
VS.

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR
CONTINENCE [SIC] FOR RESPONSE
TO APPEAL

COMMERCIAL CARRIER,
Case No. 92-1401
Defendant,

The defendants, Commercial Carriers, Inc. and Ryder
Services, by and through their counsel of record, object to the
applicant's Motion for a thirty-day extension to request
reconsideration of Judge Allen's ruling in this matter.
Judge Allen's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
are dated May 5, 1993. The Order includes a provision that any
Motion for Review shall be filed within thirty days of May 5th.
Rule 568-1-5 "Allowance for Mailing" of the Workers Compensation
Rules—Procedures, Utah Administrative Code, provides that
whenever a notice or other paper requiring or permitting some
action on behalf of a party is served on a party by mail, three

days shall be added to the prescribed period as allowed under
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the Court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . .
order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed . . . or upon
motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit
the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglgect . . . .
Applicant has stated no just cause for an extension of time,
nor has he specified excusable neglgect.

While the Motion which

apparently seeks enlargement of time to file a motion for
reconsideration was filed on the last day of the specified time
period, the Rules require that cause must be shown.
Defendants respectfully request that applicant's Motion be
denied and that Judge Allen's Order of May 5, 1993 be held final
and not subject to review or appeal*
DATED this

y

day of June, 1993.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ANNE SWENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant

17342-003\0bjecdon
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Lynette Farmer, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendants herein; that she served the attached DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION TO APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINENCE [SIC] FOR RESPONSE
TO APPEAL (Case Number 92-1401, Utah State Industrial Commission)
upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Bryan B. Davis, Esq.
3587 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the %Jt<^ day of June, 1993.

.ynetre Farmer
Lynet
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this f?44

day of June,

1993.

State of Utah
My Commission Expires:
.^STS!^
/^:5S£>^\

NOTARY PUBLIC
MARILYN L. JONES

/ r / V-=iS-> y \ PC Box45000. lOExcnangePl
ts! fifjiiijfi i f )
Salt Lake City. Utah 84U5
M
\V\ v ^ * * f $ / / /
V Commission Expires
\j\.^J^Ay*
September 25. 1994
x
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STATE OF UTAH

ADDENDUM 5:
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE NO. 92-1401
RONNIE LYN JUDD,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Ronny Lyn Judd seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's
Order denying him compensation under Utah's Workers Compensation
Act.1
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW
The issue before the Commission is whether Mr. Judd's injuries
arose out of and in the course of his employment, as required by
§35-1-45 of the Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission makes the following findings of fact:
1. .-Mr. Judd has been " employed as a truck "driver by
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the company's
Clearfield, Utah terminal.
2.
During mid-May, 1992, Mr. Judd and another driver, Mr.
Coyle, were assigned to drive two trucks loaded with new
automobiles from Missouri to California.
3.
Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21.
Because they were limited by company policy and/or government
regulation to driving no more than 10 hours or 540 miles at a
stretch, they stopped at Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night.
4.
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Judd and Coyle located an
appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked their trucks adjacent to

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq.
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each other in the parking lot, checked into their respective rooms,
then went to the motel's lounge.
5.
In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of whom was a slightacquaintance of Judd, joined them at their table. To some degree,
the women joined Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two
other younger men, who had been asking the women to dance.
6.
When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the two
women to their car and said goodby. The women then drove away.
7.
At approximately the same time, the two young men who had
also been in the lounge struck up a conversation with Judd and
Coyle. The young men suggested they buy more beer and drink it in
their motel room. Judd and Coyle declined the offer, stating it
was too late and that they had to leave early the next morning.
8.
During the course of this conversation, the young men
expressed interest in the new cars Coyle and Judd were
transporting. The young men suggested they would like to take one
of the cars for a drive. Judd told the young men that such use of
the cars was not permitted and that the cars all had alarms in
them.
9.
At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men and
walked into the parking lot to check their trucks.
They then
walked across the parking lot to a convenience store to buy some
personal items, but the store was closed.
10. As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle observed
the two young men walk into a field adjacent to the parking lot,
then return to the-parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks
that were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to their trucks and
observed the young men from the shadows.
11. The young men approached Judd and Coyle's trucks and
heard to say "these must abe the vehicles with the alarms".
and Coyle then stepped out from the shadows and told them to
away from their trucks and all the other trucks in the parking

were
Judd
stay
lot.

12. The two young men ran away into the field.
Judd and
Coyle walked into the field after them. Approximately 3 0 yards
into the field, the young men stopped. One of them began beating
Judd, resulting in very serious injuries that give rise to Judd / s
claim for compensation.
13. Hospital blood tests establish that Judd had a blood
alcohol level of .18% at the time the test was taken, after the
beating.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION
As a preliminary note, the Commission has essentially accepted
the ALJ's determination of every point of disputed fact. Thus, as
far as the objective facts are concerned, there is no variance
between the Commission and the ALJ's findings.
However, the
Commission does not accept the inferences the ALJ has drawn from
those objective facts.
In particular, the Commission finds no
basis to conclude that Judd's beating was the outgrowth of a
dispute over the women at the bar.
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides
compensation to each employees "who is injured . . . by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.11 In the case
of Mr. Judd, it is conceded that he was injured and that the injury
was by accident, as that term is used in the workers' compensation
law. The only issues that are disputed are whether his injury: 1)
arose out of his employment; and 2) arose in the course of his
employment. Those two issues are discussed in that order below.
I.

ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

As noted by the ALJ's decision, in workers' compensation law
the term "arising out of employment11 requires a causal connection
between the injury and the employment. Neither the parties nor the
ALJ have cited any Utah appellate decisions which specifically
apply the foregoing requirement to facts similar to this case.
However, Professor Larson discusses the subject:
The controlling test should be 'if the circumstances of
the employment can be fairly said to have elicited
conduct by the employee which results in his injury.'
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §11.11(c),
p. 3-205.)
More specifically with respect
Professor Larson states:

to

fights

involving employees,

If the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled with
the work itself, as most are, the assertion that the
claimant left his employment is an outright fiction, and
fictions should not be invented to block benefits
conferred by remedial statutes.
(Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §11.15(a), p. 243.)
It is difficult to imagine a situation where an employee's
work could be more entangled with an ensuing fight. Judd presence
in Kearney and at the very motel where the injury occurred was
just one stop on a continuing work assignment. The very nature of
his employment involved the transport and concomitant safe
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keeping of his truck and its cargo. The fight resulted from Judd
and Coyle's efforts to keep the other men away from the trucks.
The Commission notes the hypothesis that Judd's beating
resulted from a fight over women rather than a fight over the truck
and cars.
There is no objective evidence to support that
hypothesis and the Commission does not accept it. However, even if
the hypothesis were true, the beating was still "closely entangled
with the work itself". The Commission therefore finds that Judd's
injuries arose out of his employment.
II•

IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

As noted above, not only must an employee's injury "arise out"
of the employment to be compensable:
it must also be "in the
course of" the employment.
The term "in the course of employment" requires both that the
injury arise within the time and space boundaries of the employment
and in the course of an activity related to the employment.
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §14.00, page
4-10
As a truck driver on assignment, Judd's injuries clearly arose
within the time and space boundaries of his employment.
Even
though Judd had parked his truck some hours earlier and had spent
time in the motel lounge, any such personal deviation from his work
duties ended when
Judd and Coyle checked their trucks after
leaving the lounge, then returned to the trucks out of a suspicion
that the two younger men might have theft or vandalism in mind.
For the same reasons, the Commission finds that Judd's
injuries arose in the course of an activity related to his
employment.
The question of whether Judd and Coyle exercised good judgment
is not relevant to this discussion, as the negligence of an
employee is not a bar to workers' compensation benefits. As to
Judd's intoxication, the Commission recognizes that both Judd and
Coyle had been drinking on the night in question and that Judd had
a blood alcohol level high enough to render him unfit to operate a
motor vehicle. While §35-1-14 of the Act requires a 15% reduction
in compensation when injury is caused from the intoxication of the
employee, the facts before it do not allow the Commission to
conclude that Judd's intoxication caused his injuries.
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr.
Judd's injury suffered during the early morning hours of May 22,
1992, in Kearney Nebraska, arose out of and in the course of his
employment by Commercial Carriers.
DECISION
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this matter is
reversed and the workers'' compensation claim of Ronny Lyn Judd is
hereby reinstated.
This matter is remanded to the Adjudication
Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah for such further
action as is required on Mr. Judd's claim, consistent with this
decision. It is so ordered.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this
Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVJEW in the case of RONNY LYN JUDD, Case
Number 92-1401, on / / ^ d a v of - y ^ g , * — ^ O <
, 19^ V to the
following:
RONNY LYN JUDD
4729 SOUTH 4140 WEST
KEARNS, UTAH 84118
BRYAN B. DAVIS
3587 WEST 4700 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84119

ANNE SWENSEN
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PALACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
P O BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
770 REAR EAST PITTSBURG STREET
GREENSBURG, PA 15601
TIMOTHY C. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsels Office
Industrial Commission of Utah

ADDENDUM 6:
INTL. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFERURS WAREHOUSMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 310 v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, 587 F.2D

INTERN. BRO. OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS v. N. L. R. B.
to produce the necessary adequate and wellcontrolled studies. It would constitute the
most arid formalism for this court to remand this case to FDA to require it to state
what has since become obvious; namely, its
reasons for concluding that, contrary to the
recommendation of the NAS-NRC panel,
petitioner had not yet demonstrated the
effectiveness of Nylmerate under statutory
standards.
The order of the Commissioner is therefore
Affirmed.

O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

nity to ratify the contract, and (2) where
strike settlement agreement, entered into
by all but the one union, made employees of
such one union liable to discharge at moment of acceptance of the contract, when
being on picket lines, they could not possibly have known that a contract existed, or
even subjected such members to retroactive
liability for picketing before the contract
came into being, and where a member of
one of the other unions had not only accepted but actually had proposed language detrimental to such members of the one union, negotiation of the strike settlement
agreement constituted breach of duty of
fair representation to the one union.
Remanded for proceedings consistent
with opinion.
Robb, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion
dissenting in part.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 310, Petitioner,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, Respondent,
United Steelworkers of America,
Intervenor.
No. 76-2065.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued 19 Jan. 1978.
Decided 1 Aug. 1978.

A labor union sought review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board
dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint against other unions as members of a
joint representative. The Court of Appeals,
Wilkey, Circuit Judge, held that* (1) unions
which are constituents of a joint representative breach their duty of fair representation to another contituent union by accepting a collective-bargaining contract on
which their own members voted, without
affording that other union a prior opportu-

1. Labor Relations <3=>598, 599, 680
Under National Labor Relations Act,
ultimate fact finder is National Labor Relations Board, and courts appropriately defer
to presumptively broader gauge and experience of its members, as between Board and
administrative law judge, but while Board
is free to draw different inferences from
facts found by ALJ, its inferences should
also rest upon some findings, and Board
must not merely state that it disagrees but
must set forth basis of its disagreement
with ALJ so that court may determine
whether Board's finding is supported by
substantial evidence in record as a whole.
National Labor Relations Act, § 10(f) as
amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(f).
2. Labor Relations <s=>759
Union's breach of its duty of fair representation gives aggrieved employee right of
action in state court, or in federal court
under statute giving to district courts original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any act of Congress
regulating commerce or protecting trade
and commerce against restraints and monopolies, or under Labor Management Relations Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1337; Labor Man-

]

Cite as 587 F.2d 1176 (1978)

agement Relations Act, 1947, §§ 1 et seq.,
301, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq., 185; National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 9(a)
as amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(b)(1)(A),
159(a).
3. Labor Relations <s=»219
Exclusive representative owes duty of
fair representation to all workers in unit,
not merely to its own union members. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A),
9(a)
as
amended
29
U.S.C.A.
§§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a).
4. Labor Relations <s=>222
Labor Act does not require union to
accord its rank-and-file members right to
ratify collective bargaining contract which
it has negotiated, but once certified representative has determined to gain membership approval before it accepts contract, it
must accord opportunity to vote equally to
all unit members. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a).
5. Labor Relations <s=»222
Vote of members of one union, which
was member of joint representation group,
to reject further extensions of old contract
and vote of other unions to accept final
offer that became the contract, could not be
combined by administrative law judge or
National Labor Relations Board so as to
rule that such other unions allowed members of first-mentioned union equal opportunity to exercise their vote, thus satisfying
obligation, of such other unions to firstmentioned union, of fair representation.
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 8
(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a).
6. Labor Relations «©=222
Under evidence, right of members of
one union, which was member of joint representation group, to vote on contract offer
by employer was denied by other members
of such joint group, in violation of duty of
fair representation, whether or not such
vote was necessary to determination of outcome on contract offer, and despite contention, rejected by the court, that members of
the one union, by exercising lawful right to

strike on expiration of old contract an»
such reason being dispersed, forfeited
right to vote. National Labor Rela
Act, §§ 8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29
C.A. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a).
7. Labor Relations <a=>219
Where strike settlement agreerr
entered into by all but one union of j
representation group, made employee!
such one union liable to discharge a t
ment of acceptance of the contract, w
being on picket lines, they could not p<
bly have known that contract existed
even subjected such members to retroac
liability for picketing before contract a
into being, and where member of one of
other unions had not only accepted but
tually had proposed language detrimei
to such members of the one union, s
other unions entertaining animus tow
such one union, negotiation of the str
settlement agreement constituted breach
duty of fair representation to the one uni
National Labor Relations Act, §§
8(b)(1)(A), 9(a) as amended 29 U.S.C
§§ 157, 158(b)(1)(A), 159(a).
8. Labor Relations <&=» 395.2
A union commits unfair labor practi
of causing or attempting to cause employ
to discriminate against employee in viol
tion of National Labor Relations Act wh
such union causes or attempts to cause ei
ployer to discriminate against an employ
in regard to hire, tenure or condition
employment.
National Labor Relatio
Act, § 8(b)(2), as amended 29 U.S.C,
§ 158(b)(2).
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Before ROBINSON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by WILKEY,
Circuit Judge.
Opinion filed by ROBB, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
WILKEY, Circuit Judge:
Teamsters Local 310 petitions for review
of an order of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) dismissing an unfair labor
practice complaint. The complaint charged
that three AFL-CIO unions, as members of
a joint representative, breached their duty
of fair representation to members of the
Teamsters, in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Labor A c t ; ! and that those unions attempted to cause the employer to discipline
or discharge members of the Teamsters, in
violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the
Act. 2
The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) upheld these charges, but was reversed by the Board. 3 We believe that the
Board's order is not supported by substantial evidence, and we accordingly remand
for findings of fact and conclusions of law
consistent with the evidence in the record
as a whole.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

FACTS
The facts, essentially undisputed, are
elaborated in the decisions below and can be
1. NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)
(1970):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in
the exercise of the rights [to organize and
bargain collectively] guaranteed in section
157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein
2.

NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents—

recapitulated briefly here. Since 1968 unions representing employees in the nonferrous mining industry have engaged in nationwide coordinated bargaining. This coordination is effected through a National
Conference, a coalition of 26 unions which
delegates to a Steering Committee the responsibility for setting minimum bargaining
goals as guidelines for negotiations with
industry employers. Before concluding a
collective bargaining agreement, local negotiating committees must submit contract
proposals to the Steering Committee for
approval.
The employer in this case is Duval Corp.,
a copper company, which engages in collective bargaining on a single-employer basis.
Negotiations on behalf of Duval's workers
are conducted by a negotiating committee
comprised of representatives from four unions: the Steelworkers, Laborers, Operating
Engineers (collectively, the AFL-CIO unions), and the Teamsters. As is the pattern
in the nonferrous mining industry, these
four unions have been jointly certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent at Duval's
properties; the joint representatives thus
function as "the union" in negotiating and
signing collective-bargaining
contracts.
Dissension between the AFL-CIO unions
and the Teamsters has existed for years and
forms the backdrop of the negotiations at
issue here. This dissension manifested itself in discourtesies at the bargaining table
and violence in the field, in "raids" by one
union on the membership lists of others,
and in the filing of representation petitions
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section
NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S C. § 158(a)(3) (1970),
prohibits an employer from encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization "by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment.
3. The A U ' s decision is printed at 226 N.L.R B.
775 (1976). The Board's decision and order is
printed in id. at 772, 94 L.R.R.M. 1239 (1976).

designed to secure replacement of a given
union by its rival.

there was a dispute, unresolved by t
as to whether they were informs

In August 1974 Duval and the joint representatives commenced bargaining to replace the contract that was to expire 30
September 1974. In an apparent effort to
insulate itself from the uncertainty attending the interunion rivalry, Duval at the
outset informed all four unions of the company's understanding that negotiations
would continue on a joint basis, and that
"once the Spokesman for the Unionfs] informs the Company that a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement has been accepted
. a new agreement exists." 4 The
ALJ found on undisputed testimony that
Duval reiterated this position during the
course of negotiations and that the unions
agreed. 5 The spokesman for the union negotiating committee was a member of the
Steelworkers.

On the morning and evening of 2
the AFL-CIO unions held membersl
fication meetings to consider Duva
tract proposals. Members of the Te.
and their representatives were refu
mission to these meetings. DuvaPi
concessions were conveyed to the AE
employees at the evening session, ai
voted 474-110 to accept the contrac
spokesman for the negotiating con
called the Teamsters' representati
forming him that there was a contn
that the Teamsters' pickets were "il
called the Steering Committee and n
authorization to accept the contrac
notified the company that "they had
lective-bargaining agreement." 6 Th
and the Board both found that, und
terms of the union-company understa
a contract thereupon came into beinf

Joint negotiations continued amid increasing acrimony through 1 October; several issues were resolved, but Duval's wage
offer still fell short of the Steering Committee's guideline. The negotiations recessed
that evening so that the Teamsters' membership could vote on extending the old
contract further; the Teamsters met separately, as they had done on previous occasions, in order to avoid a hostile confrontation and possible violence. At this meeting,
the Teamsters voted 213-42 to reject additional contract extensions and to strike;
they apprised the AFL-CIO unions of their
vote and set up picket lines.
Later that evening negotiations resumed
between Duval and representatives of the
AFL-CIO unions, at which time the company raised its wage offer to meet the Steering Committee's guideline. The Teamsters'
representatives did not attend this session;
4.
5.

On 3 October the Teamsters' repre
tives and picket captains were to
peatedly by AFL-CIO and company
cials that a contract was in effect an
the pickets were illegal. The Teai
replied that they had not yet ratific
contract, that their ratification m<
could not be scheduled until that e\
owing to the difficulty of reassen
workers dispersed by the strike, and
the pickets would not be removed unti
fication had occurred. The Teamsters
fied the contract that evening and
down the picket lines.
On the afternoon of 3 October repn
atives of the company met with repres
tives of the AFL-CIO unions to negoti
strike-settlement ("back-to-work") a
ment. The Teamsters were not notifi

226 N.L.R.B. at 779.
Id. The Board made the same finding, id. at
77 , 94 L.R.R M. at 1240:
Duval's attorney
sent a letter to
the various members of the joint representatives stating, in part, that, once the spokesman for the unions had informed the Company that a collective-bargaining agreement

had been accepted, a new agreement e>
Although the unions did not reply to
letter, [the Duval Representative's] unc<
verted testimony was that this positioi
restated during the course of the negoti*
and agreed to by the unions.
6. 226 N.L.R.B. at 781.
7.

Id. at 786; id. at 775, 94 L.R.R.M. at

8

this meeting, and no Teamsters attended
it. The spokesman for the negotiating committee (who, as noted above, was a member
of the Steelworkers) proposed,9 and the
company accepted, a provision under which
Duval agreed not to commence any legal
action against the AFL-CIO unions, but
reserved the right "to seek redress against
any individual union" and "to discharge or
discipline any employee" who continued to
picket or to sanction a strike or picket
against the company "after 9:30 p. m. on
October 2, 1974," in violation of the new
contract's no-strike clause.10
On 4 October 1974 Duval discharged two
Teamsters employees and disciplined a third
for picketing on 2 and 3 October in violation
of the no-strike clause. These workers had
been warned, directly or indirectly, that
their picketing was illegal because the new
contract was in effect. The ALJ found
that the discharged employees had been
aggressive in processing grievances, active
in implementing the Teamsters' program of
soliciting members from the ranks of the
AFL-CIO unions, and vocal exponents of
the Teamsters' demands in collective-bargaining negotiations.11 The ALJ also found
considerable evidence of employer hostility
to these workers.12 Efforts to reinstate the
workers failed, and the Teamsters filed
charges with the Board.
B.

Course of the

Litigation

The ALJ found that the AFL-CIO unions
had breached their duty of fair representation to the Teamsters, in violation of

§ 8(b)(1)(A), by accepting the collective-bargaining contract before the Teamsters had
had an opportunity to ratify it. The ALJ
found that these unions had likewise
breached their duty of fair representation
to the Teamsters, in violation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A), and had attempted to cause the
employer to discharge or discipline Teamsters employees, in violation of § 8(b)(2), by
negotiating a strike-settlement agreement
which made Teamsters liable to discharge
for picketing at a time when they could not
be expected to know that a contract containing a no-strike clause had been concluded. The ALJ recommended that the A F L CIO unions be ordered to cease and desist
from unfair labor practices, and, finding
that their breach of duty had directly contributed to the disciplined workers' loss of
employment, recommended that they be ordered to make those workers whole for any
loss of pay they had suffered. The Board,
reversing the ALJ, drew different inferences from the facts, found no violations of the
Act, and dismissed the complaint.
II.

ance Procedure only as to the determination
of the question of whether the employee so
disciplined or discharged did actively participate in, support, or encourage such strike,
work stoppage, or slowdown.

8. 226 N.L.R.B. at 786 & n. 29. See id. at 772 n.
1.
9.

Id. at 781.

10. Id. The contract agreed to on the evening of
2 October contained the following provision, id.
at 782:
Section 2. No strike.
(1) The Union agrees that during the life of
this Agreement there shall be no strike, work
stoppage, or slowdown called, authorized,
approved, or sanctioned by the Union.
(2) Any employee who actively participates in, supports, or encourages any such
strike, work stoppage, or slowdown shall be
subject to discipline or discharge by the
Company with right of appeal to the Griev-

ANALYSIS

[1] We review the Board's order to determine whether its findings are "supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." I3 The findings and
decision of the Administrative Law Judge
form an important part of the "record" on
which this judgment of substantiality is to
be based.14 Under the statute, of course,
the ultimate factfinder is the Board, and
courts appropriately defer to "the presump-

11.

Id. at 782.

12. Id. at 782, 783.
13. NLRA § 10(0, 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1970).
14. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 492 97, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143
U.S.App.D.C. 383, 395, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (1970)
(Leventhal, J.).
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tively broader gauge and experience of [its]
members." 15 But while the Board is free
to draw different inferences from the facts
found by the ALJ, its inferences "should
also rest upon some findings;" the Board
must not "merely [state] that it disagrees," l(J but must "set forth the basis of
[its] disagreement with the ALJ so that we
may determine whether the Board's finding
is supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole." 17
A.

Duty of Fair

Representation

[2] The principles of labor law that
frame our decision are well established, and
the parties do not disagree as to them. A
union has the duty, derived from its status
as certified exclusive bargaining agent under § 9(a),18 to represent all employees in
the unit fairly.19 This duty governs the
union's behavior in all phases of the collective-bargaining process, from the negotiation and acceptance of collective agreements to their enforcement through the
processing of grievances.20 Breach of the
duty of fair representation
violates
§ 8(b)(1)(A), for it tends to encourage work15. Oil Workers Local 4-243 v. NLRB, 124 U.S.
App.D.C. 113, 116, 362 F.2d 943, 946 (1966)
(Leventhal, J.).
16. Retail Store Employees Local 400 v. NLRB,
123 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 362, 360 F.2d 494, 496
(1965) (Fahy, J.).
17. Local 441, IBEW v. NLRB, 167 U.S.App.D.C.
53, 55, 510 F.2d 1274, 1276 (1975) (Leventhal,
J.).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970):
Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment
. . . .
19. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct.
903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Humphrey
v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50, 84 S.Ct. 363, 11
L.Ed.2d 370(1964).
20. See C. J. Morris, The Developing Labor Law
743 AA (1971) (citing authorities).
21. See, e. g., Kesner v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1169,
1174 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 983 &
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ers to join, or discourage them from joinin
certain unions, thus restraining them in tl
free exercise of their § 7 rights.21 In ord<
to constitute an unfair labor practice,
union's conduct must be more than mere
negligent; it must be "arbitrary, discrim
natory, or in bad faith," 22 or be based c
considerations that are "irrelevant, invirj
ous, or unfair." 23
[3] The AFL-CIO unions in this cai
were jointly certified with the Teamsters i
the exclusive bargaining agent for Duval
employees. Since an exclusive represent;
tive owes a duty of fair representation 1
all workers in the unit, not merely to i
own union members,24 there can be r
doubt, and the Board does not deny, ths
the AFL-CIO unions owed a general dut
of fair representation to the Teamsters en
ployees here. The Board, however, do<
deny that these unions breached their dut
in either of the respects found by the AL.
the ratification of the contract and the n<
gotiation of the strike-settlement agre<
ment.25 We discuss these issues in tun
1022, 97 S.Ct. 499 (1976); Truck Drivers Loc
568 v. NLRB, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 367-36
379 F.2d 137, 144-45 (1967); Local 12, Unitt
Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (51
Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 837, 88 S.C
53, 19 L.Ed.2d 99 (1967); Miranda Fuel Cc
Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d CI
1963). A union's breach of its duty of fa
representation also gives the aggrieved emplo;
ee a right of action in state court, or in feder
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) or LMR
§ 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See Vaca
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 179-80, 87 S.Ct. 903, 1
L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); T. Kheel, 6 Labor La
§ 28.03[2a] (1974); C. J., Morris, supra note 2
at 739.
22. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190, 87 S.Ct. i
916.
23. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. at 181
51 L.R.R.M. at 1586.
24. E. g., Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 24!
255, 65 S.Ct. 238, 89 L.Ed. 216 (1944).
25. The Board also rejected the ALJ's conch
sion that the AFL-CIO unions breached the
duty of fair representation by denying th
Teamsters' business representatives access t
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[4] m 1. The Ratification
Procedures.
The Labor Act does not require a union to
accord its rank-and-file members the right
to ratify a collective-bargaining contract
which it has negotiated. The ALJ reasoned, however, that once a certified representative has determined to gain membership approval before it accepts a contract, it
must accord the opportunity to vote equally
to all unit members. This reasoning, we
think, is sound. By denying a group of
workers the chance to ratify, the union
risks subjecting them to the disadvantages
of a contract whose acceptance they could
have prevented, and risks depriving them of
the benefits of a contract whose acceptance
they could have ensured. By discriminating
against a group of workers in this way, a
union plainly fails to represent them fairly
"in respect to [their] rates of pay, wages,
hours
. , or other conditions of employment" 26 over the coming contract term.
In this case the ALJ found that the A F L CIO unions accepted the new contract on
the basis of the ratification vote of their
own members, at a time when the Teamsters had not ratified and under circumstances in which they could not ratify until
the next day. Finding the action of these
unions arbitrary and evidencing hostile discrimination, the ALJ concluded that a violation of the duty of fair representation had
been established.
The Board, while nowhere denying that
the AFL-CIO unions' conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, seeks
to rationalize its rejection of the ALJ's conclusion on two grounds. It argues, first,
that the Teamsters in effect were given an
opportunity to ratify the contract when
the 2 October membership ratification meetings. See p - of 190 U S App D C . p 1179
of 587 F.2d supra. We see no reason to disturb
the Board's order in this respect.
26.

NLRA § 9(a), 29 U S.C. § 159(a) (1970).

27.

Brief of NLRB at 17, 18.

28. The Board states in its decision that the
spokesman for the AFL CIO unions actually
made this calculation, out of deference to the
Teamsters, before communicating acceptance
of the contract to Duval. See 226 N.L.R.B. at
773, 94 L.R.R M at 1241. The ALJ, however,

they voted on 1 October; and second, that
the AFL-CIO unions owed the Teamsters
no duty of fair representation with respect
to contract ratification, since ratification
was "entirely an internal union affair," a
mere "advisory" vote with "no effect on the
terms and conditions of Teamster employment." 27 These arguments rest on questionable logic, derive no evidentiary support
from the record, and must be rejected.
[5] First, the Board reasons that the
Teamsters 1 October ballot, in which they
voted 213^2 to reject Duval's then-current
proposals and to strike, can be added to the
AFL-CIO unions' 2 October ballot, in which
they voted 474 110 to accept Duval's final
offer, thus producing an overall vote of
51r>-323 to accept the contract.28 This argument is illogical, both in qualitative and
in quantitative terms. The Teamsters on 1
October did not vote on the final offer that
became the contract; they voted to reject
further extensions of the old contract and
to strike, at a time when Duval had not
made its final offer and when its wage
proposal was not even up to the Steering
Committee's guideline. The two votes, in
short, were on different things, and to add
them together, as the ALJ said, is to "add
apples and oranges." 29 Quantitatively, the
Board's argument fares no better. There is
no reason to believe that the same number
of Teamsters would have voted on 2 October as voted on 1 October, or that the
outcome of their vote would have been the
same. There were 425 Teamsters in the
bargaining unit, more than enough to have
defeated the contract's ratification, and the
Board's speculations as to what the Teamsters' vote might have been 30 are without
made no such finding, and the testimony on
this subject was ambiguous. See J.A 254-55.
29. 226 N.L.R.B. at 785.
30. Speculation about the possible results of a
new vote by the Teamsters simply cannot, in
any event, operate to neutralize the AFL-CIO
unions' omission in the circumstances of this
case. Though the final contract offer was more
favorable to the Teamsters than the proposal of
1 October, the Teamsters who voted to accept
the initial offer might well have been encouraged by Duval's concessions to press for fur-

\\
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evidentiary support. The AFL-CIO unions'
refusal to let the Teamsters vote on the
contract cannot be justified by speculating
that their vote would not have mattered.
[6] The Board's second argument, that
the AFL-CIO unions owed the Teamsters
no duty of fair representation with respect
to contract ratification because ratification
was "entirely an internal union affair," is
no more convincing than the first. As a
general proposition, it is true that a union
only breaches its duty of fair representation
when it discriminates against employees "in
matters affecting their employment." 31
This is because a union's duty of fair representation derives from its status as exclusive bargaining representative under § 9(a);
a union, therefore, can be held to represent
employees unfairly only in regard to those
matters as to which it represents them at
all—namely, "rates of pay, wages, hours
., or other conditions of employment." 32 Notwithstanding the correctness
of its premise, however, the Board's argument that depriving the Teamsters of the
opportunity to vote on a contract that
would govern them for the next three years
had "no effect on the terms and conditions
of [their] employment" is preposterous.
The Board starts with the proposition
that, under the terms of the union-company
understanding, a collective-bargaining contract would be held to come into being
when the spokesman for the negotiating
committee communicated its acceptance to
ther gains instead of ratifying the new proposal
as it was. That being so, it was incumbent on
the AFL-CIO unions to afford the Teamsters an
opportunity to cast their ballots on the offer of
2 October. Thus, even were it reasonable to
conclude that the Teamsters favoring the first
offer would have voted similarly with respect
to the second—a prophecy we decline to endorse—the substantial risk of the contrary result made necessary a second vote by the
Teamsters. And it was untoward for the AFLCIO unions to deny them that privilege while
extending it to the AFL-CIO membership. The
dissent misses this fundamental point in urging
that the Board's prediction of a particular outcome had some support in the evidence. See
diss. op. at
of 190 U.S.App.D.C, at
1186 1187 of 587 F 2d.

Duval. From this, the Board concludes U
membership ratification was merely "ad\
ory" and thus was not "necessary" to c<
tract acceptance. This may be correct as
the Duval-union relationship, but not as
the inter-union arrangement. For to s
that, as between Duval and the unions,
contract came into being on 2 October (a
we accept the findings of the ALJ and t
Board that it did) is not to say that,
between the AFL-CIO unions and tl
Teamsters, the spokesman acted properly
communicating acceptance before tl
Teamsters had ratified.
The Teamsters' ratification may not ha>
been "necessary" in the sense that its al
sence rendered the contractual acceptanc
void; but this does not mean that the
ratification was not "necessary" in th
sense that the AFL-CIO unions proper!
had to get it first. All the evidence in th
record indicates that membership ratifies
tion was necessary in the latter sense. Th
undisputed evidence revealed that all previ
ous contracts at Duval had been submitter
for membership ratification prior to accept
ance.33 The constitutions of three of th<
constituent unions (Laborers, Operating En
gineers, and Teamsters) required member
ship ratification prior to acceptance.34 Mosl
importantly, the AFL-CIO unions them
selves acted in accordance with the belie!
that ratification was required prior to acceptance, since the spokesman did not communicate acceptance of the contract to Du31. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. at 185,
51 L.R.R.M. at 1586. See Retana v. Apartment
Operators Union Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1024
(9th Cir. 1972). ("It is no answer to say that
the complaint relates to appellee union's 'internal* policies and practices. . .
As a practical matter, intra-union conduct could not be
wholly excluded from the duty of fair representation, for .
internal union policies and
practices may have a substantial impact upon
the external relationships of members of the
unit to their employer.")
32.

NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).

33.

See 226 N.L.R.B. at 785; J.A. at 476.

34.

See J.A. at 473.
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val until immediately after the AFL-CIO
members' votes had been counted. 35
For these reasons, we conclude that the
AFL-CIO unions did in fact deny the
Teamsters the opportunity to ratify the collective-bargaining contract, 38 and that in so
doing those unions discriminated against
the Teamsters "in matters affecting their
employment." We accordingly hold that
the Board's order dismissing this aspect of
the complaint is unsupported by substantial
evidence.
[7] 2. The Strike-Settlement
Agreement
The ALJ found that the AFL-CIO
unions breached their duty of fair representation to the Teamsters by negotiating a
strike-settlement agreement that subjected
Teamsters employees to discharge for picketing at a time when they could not be
expected to know that a new contract containing a no-strike clause had been concluded. As noted above, the strike-settlement
agreement made Duval employees liable to
discharge for picketing after 9:30 p. m. on 2
October. The evidence is in dispute as to
when the new contract came into being.
35. The only evidence the Board cites for the
proposition that membership ratification was
"irrelevant" to contract acceptance is "the fact
that earlier in 1974, the Steering Committee
compelled negotiators to reject a contract at
Anamax (an industry employer) despite membership ratification." Brief of NLRB at 20 n. 7.
In the Anamax situation, the Steering Committee refused to approve a proposed contract
because it provided for a wage increase below
the Steering Committee's guideline. See pp.
of 190 U.S.App.D.C, pp. 1178 1179
of 587 F.2d supra Yet the fact that the Committee could compel rejection of a contract that
the membership had accepted does not demonstrate that it could compel acceptance of a
contract that the membership had rejected. As
noted in the text, the practice at Duval was
precisely the contrary.
36. The dissent argues that "the Teamsters were
accorded the same opportunity as the other
employees to vote on October 2 on the final
offer;" it was only because the Teamsters
"were out on strike [that they] did not vote that
day." Diss. op. at
of - — U.S.App.D.C, at
1186 of 587 F.2d (emphasis added). This argument, we think, is somewhat formalistic. The
AFL-CIO unions knew full well that the Teamsters employees had been dispersed by the
strike and could not be assembled for a vote
until 3 October. Any "opportunity" the Team-

The company representative testified that
the spokesman called him to accept the
contract at 9:30 p. m. on 2 October; the
spokesman himself placed the time of notification at 11:00 p. m.37 At best, then, the
strike settlement agreement made employees liable to discharge at the moment of the
contract's acceptance, when Teamsters on
the picket lines could not possibly have
known that a contract existed; at worst,
the strike settlement agreement subjected
the Teamsters to retroactive liability for
picketing IV2 hours before the contract
came into being. The ALJ, resolving credibility questions, found that the AFL-CIO
unions had not even notified the Teamsters
of the strike-settlement meeting. 38 Again
making credibility resolutions, the ALJ
found that the spokesman (a member of the
Steelworkers) not only had accepted, but
actually had proposed, the language detrimental to the Teamsters. 39 Finding ample
evidence of AFL-CIO animus towarJ the
Teamsters, the ALJ concluded that negotiation of the strike-settlement agreement
constituted a breach of their duty of fair
representation.
sters were given to vote on 2 October, therefore, was utterly meaningless. If the AFL-CIO
unions really were representing the Teamsters
fairly, they would not have accorded them such
a spectral opportunity to exercise their rights.
Nor do we think that the AFL-CIO unions'
conduct can be rationalized on the theory that
the Teamsters "forfeited" their right to vote by
going on strike. See diss. op. at
of 190
U.S.App.D.C, at 1186 of 587 F.2d Judge Robb
does not deny that the Teamsters had the right
under § 7 to strike after their contract had
expired. Judge Robb seems to agree that the
Teamsters, on the facts of this case, also had
the right to an equal vote on the collective-bargaining contract. To suggest that the Teamsters, by exercising their first right, should be
held to have forfeited the second, is to pose a
dilemma quite foreign to the spirit of our labor
law. The dilemma, in any event, is particularly
obnoxious here because it was created by the
AFL-CIO unions. If they had simply waited
until after the Teamsters had voted no one
would have had to "forfeit" any rights at all.
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The Board, while explicitly accepting all
of the ALJ's credibility findings, 40 rejected
this conclusion. In its decision, the Board
made no findings and gave no reason for
doing so. In its brief, the Board argues
that the Teamsters employees were not disciplined because of the strike settlement
agreement, but for picketing in violation of
a no-strike clause in a valid contract; and
that they were not disciplined unknowingly,
but after repeated warnings that a contract
existed and that their picketing was in consequence illegal.41 Whatever the merit of
these arguments, they are irrelevant to the
issue here. The causes and the rightfulness
of the actual discharges on 4 October have
nothing to do with the propriety of the
AFL-CIO unions' action the day before.
The ALJ found that those unions deliberately and unfairly subjected Teamsters employees to an unreasonable risk of discharge
for unknowing conduct. Whether this risk
was realized in precisely the way the A F L CIO unions envisioned is immaterial in deciding whether they breached their duty of
fair representation in creating it. We accordingly hold that the Board's order dismissing this aspect of the complaint was
unsupported by substantial evidence.

cause discharge in violation of § 8(b
and concluded that the discharges owe<
to the unions' conduct, but to the en
er's independent decision to discharge i
ers who were violating a no-strike clat
a valid contract.
In view of the sparseness of the reco
this issue, we express no view on the n
of the (b)(2) claim or on the appropriat
of the ALJ's proposed remedy. On reri
the Board will have to reconsider its co
sion that the AFL-CIO unions did
breach their duty of fair representati<
negotiating the strike-settlement a]
ment. If it concludes that the duty
breached, the Board should consider wl
er that breach per se constitutes a viols
of § 8(b)(2) or whether more evidence c
attempt to cause discharge is necessary
the Board finds a violation of § 8(bXS
should consider whether that violation
causally related to the disciplining of
three Teamsters employees, giving ar,
priate weight to the ALJ's findings of
ion and employer hostility towards tl
In this connection the Board should
consider the relevance of the General G
sel's determination that Duval, in firing
workers, did not discriminate against tl
in regard to tenure of employment in vi
tion of § 8(a)(3).

37. 226 N.L R.B. at 780.

[8] B. Attempt to Cause Discharge of
Employees.
A union violates § 8(b)(2)
when, for arbitrary, irrelevant, or invidious
reasons it causes or attempts to cause the
employer to discriminate against an employee in regard to hire, tenure, or condition
of employment. The ALJ found that the
AFL-CIO unions, by negotiating the strikesettlement agreement as described above,
attempted to cause Duval to discharge picketing Teamsters employees because they
were part of a dissident group. 42 The ALJ
further found that the AFL-CIO unions'
conduct directly contributed to the disciplined employees' loss of employment, and
recommended that they be made whole.
The Board, having found no breach of the
duty of fair representation in violation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A), likewise found no attempt to

ROBB, Circuit Judge, dissenting in p
I think the Board's conclusions regard
the ratification procedure were consist
with the Administrative Law Judge's fi
ings and supported by substantial evidei
Therefore those conclusions cannot be <
turbed on the basis of the contentions urj
by petitioner Teamsters. Accordingly
dissent from that part of the majoril
opinion reversing the Board's holding t
the AFL-CIO unions did not breach Ui
duty of fair representation in the cond
of the contract ratification.

38.

Id. at 786 & n. 29.

40.

Id. at 772 n. 1.

42. 226 N.L.R.B. at 786-87.

39.

Id. at 786 & n. 28.

41.

Brief for NLRB at 23-25.

43.

Remanded for
with this opinion.

proceedings

Id. at 775, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1243.

consist
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The ALJ ruled that the AFL-CIO unions
breached their duty by denying the Teamsters the same opportunity to vote on contract ratification as was accorded to the
other employees. 226 N.L.R.B. 785. The
ALJ said that a union was not required to
permit employees to vote on a proposed
contract, but that once the right to vote
was granted it must be extended to all
evenly. The Teamsters' opportunity to vote
on the offer outstanding on October 1 was
not, according to the ALJ, an adequate
substitute for the opportunity to vote on
the final offer because the later offer contained additional employer concessions. Id.
As a corollary to this ruling, the ALJ found
that the AFL-CIO unions further breached
their duty by accepting the contract before
the Teamsters had voted on the final order.
226 N.L.R.B. 786.
The Board disagreed. It concluded that
if the Teamsters had no opportunity to vote
on the final offer, it was due to the union's
"gofing] its own way" and calling a strike.
226 N.L.R.B. 774. The Board also noted
that the AFL-CIO unions had considered
the ratification vote by the Teamsters on
October 1 in determining that a majority of
employees favored the final offer. Id. The
Teamsters had voted 213 to 42 to reject the
proposal before them on October 1. Id.
The Board found that when added to the
AFL-CIO votes cast on October 2, the
Teamsters vote showed that 516 employees
favored accepting the contract while 323
would reject it. Id. The Board therefore
believed that a second Teamsters vote
would not have changed the outcome
Id.
The Board's principal ground for its reversal of the ALJ—that any lack of an
opportunity by the Teamsters to vote on the
final offer was due to the union's decision
to strike—is contrary to neither the ALJ's
findings nor the evidence. The Board
merely concluded as a matter of law that
the Teamsters must be held accountable for
their unilateral action of withdrawing and
striking. This conclusion is supported by
the evidence and by the ALJ's findings, and
justifies affirmance of the Board's holding.
The ALJ found that the Teamsters' business representative received a copy of the

final offer on the afternoon of October 2
when it was delivered to the other unions,
and that the business representative notified Duval that the Teamsters would be
unable to vote on the offer that day because they were not working. 226 N.L.R.B.
780. Thus, the Teamsters were accorded
the same opportunity as the other employees to vote on October 2 on the final offer;
because they were out on strike, however,
the Teamsters did not vote that day.
Nor was the alternate ground for the
Board's conclusion contrary to the evidence.
The Board concluded that in light of the
results from the AFL-CIO union's vote on
October 2 and the Teamsters' vote on October 1, a second Teamsters vote would not
have affected the outcome. This conclusion
is not contrary to any factual finding by the
ALJ. Moreover contrary to the majority's
assertion, I think the Board could rely on
the Teamsters vote on October 1 as at least
indicative of how the Teamsters would have
voted on the offer, which proposed greater
union benefits than the earlier offer. The
company had added to its final offer a wage
increase plus several concessions for which
the union negotiators had fought hard.
Further, the final offer included a union
demand apparently benefiting only the
Teamsters: installation of air conditioning
on haulage trucks. 226 N.L.R.B. 780. Installation of the air conditioning was a
Teamsters' demand that had been withdrawn from bargaining by a majority vote
of the union negotiating committee. 226
N.L.R B. 779. However, because of the
Teamsters' direct appeal to Duval, coupled
with the union's threat to thwart conclusion
of an agreement, Duval agreed to install air
conditioning in the trucks. 226 N.L.R.B.
779. Accordingly, the Board's conclusion
that at least an equal number of Teamsters
would have voted to accept the more attractive final offer was reasonably derived
from the evidence.
The Board's reversal thus was not predicated on any finding contrary to those of
the ALJ and it was fully supported by the
record. Moreover, the Board's conclusion
that the AFL-CIO unions had not discrimi-
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Cite as 587 F.2d 1187 (1978)

nated against members of the Teamsters on
the basis of any unfair, arbitrary, irrelevant, or invidious distinctions was reasonable. Like the members of the other unions,
the Teamsters had the opportunity on October 2 to vote on the final offer. The
Board's conclusion that they forsook it by
going on strike was reasonable. Further,
the Board acted reasonably in taking into
account the earlier vote by the Teamsters.
The majority has substituted its conclusion
from the evidence for the expert judgments
of the Board. This a court cannot do.
NLRB v. Bridge Workers Local 103, 434
U.S. 335, 98 S.Ct. 651, 54 L.Ed.2d 586
(1978); see 29 U.S.C. § 160.

Ellen L. RAY and William H.
Schaap, Appellants,
v.
Stansfield TURNER, Director Central
Intelligence Agency.
No. 77-1401.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 17, 1978.
Decided Aug. 24, 1978.
As Amended Aug. 25, 1978.
As Amended Nov. 15, 1978.

Two individuals brought suit under the
Freedom of Information Act against the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
seeking disclosure of documents concerning
plaintiffs in CIA files. The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,
dismissed the suit upon the basis of affidavits supplied by an official of the CIA, and
plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals
held, inter alia, that: (1) as regards a claim
of exemption under the FOIA, Congress has

11

left the matter of in camera inspection
the discretion of the district court, with
any indication of the extent of its pro
use; the ultimate criterion is simply t
whether the district judge believes that
camera inspection is needed in order
make a responsible de novo determinat
on the claims of exemption; (2) in resr
to the CIA's invocation of exemptions 1
and 6 to disclosure of certain docume
under the FOIA, a critical problem of s
regability was shown on the record prese
ed—some portion of the documents mij
be exempt, but the FOIA might contc
plate disclosure in part; the difficulty ar«
from the CIA's proffer of multiple exen
tions for each withheld document, and v
maintained by the district court's conclu
ry rulings, and (3) as regards the FOIA,
agency may not rely on the "exemption
document" approach even in a national J
curity context; the agency must provide
reasonable segregation as to the portions
the document that are involved in each
its claims for exemption.
Error; remanded.
J. Skelly Wright, Chief Judge, co
curred in the remand and filed an opinio
1. Records <s=»14
As regards de novo review of Freedo
of Information Act exemptions claimed 1
the government, the salient characteristi
of de novo review in the national securi
context can be summarized as follows: (
government has the burden of establishh
an exemption; (2) court must make a <
novo determination; (3) in doing this,
must first accord substantial weight to i
agency's affidavit concerning the details <
the classified status of the disputed recor
and (4) whether and how to conduct an i
camera examination of the documents res
in the sound discretion of the court.
U.S.C.A. § 552.
2. Records <s=»14
If exemption from the Freedom of Ii
formation Act is claimed by the goven
ment on the basis of national security, tli
court must be satisfied that proper proc<
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present % court and stipulated that the of- plication for compensation* plaintiff brings
lor should bo made. There la nothing in certiorari. Affirmed*
Mir statute requiring the service of a notico
L. A. McGee, of Orlce, for plaintiff.
rf th* entry of an ordor retaxtng costs.
•
Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Genu, and J. Robert
This court baa bold that a part? who pre- Bobinson, Aaat AUy. Gen* for defendants.
pares tbo findings of fact, conclusion* of
aw, and doeroo moat of necessity bo deemed" THUBMAN, C. J. Certiorari to review an
bo have notice of tbo decision. Jensen v. award of the Utah Industrial Commission
Lfefatensteln* 45 Utah, 320,145 P. 1086; Cody denying plaintiff's application for compensar. Cody, 47 Utah, 4M» 154 P. 962. So, bare, tion.
J*e attorneys tor defeudsnta who filed a petiXt ia admitted that on July 20, 1927, the
tion to retax coata and upon tbo hearing ot\ plaintiff, Wilkerson, was in the employ of the
hair petition atipulatod that tbo amount of Utah state road commission, engaged in driv?oats bo fixed at 198 moat of necessity bo ing a road grader toward the east on what
loomed to baro notice of what waa dona up* ia known as the Oolton-Duchesne highway.
m their request and in their praaenco. Wo The grader was being drawn by a four-horse
MO no oocapo from tho eoncluaion that tho team driven by Wilkerson on the left side of
notion to atrika tho bill of exception* ahonld the road throwing a swath of gravel to the
» granted. Such ia tho order. All of appal* left or lower side. While Wilkerson waa
tots' assignments of error are baaed upon thus engaged a car driven by Mary Lowland,
tho bill of exceptions.
accompanied by Frank Both sitting on her
It therefore follows that the Judgment ran* right on the front sent, approached from the
lared in this eanae ahonld be and the same is east on the same aide of the road upon which
Wilkerson was operating the grader. When
ifltaned. Respondent ia awarded coata.
the car and grader met both stopped. Wilkerson dropped the reins of his horses and
THUBMAN, a J^ and CH1CBBY, STHAUP, descended from the grader. He went to the
ind GIDEON, JJ n concur.
right side of the car, where Both sat, and an
altercation occurred between him and Both,
in which Wilkerson received n gunshot
wound which resulted in a serious injury.
Wilkerson applied to the commission for comWILKERSON V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISpensation under the Indnstrlal Act. 8everal
SION OF UTAH et at (No. 4607.)
hearings were had upon the application and
Court of Utah* Hsrch 26, 1928.
compensation denied. Behearing was also
1. Master and servant *»4O0(4)-Evldeeee la denied, and the case ia before this court for
ssapmatlu precooslaoa sestaleed ftsolsf review.
that wesnd reserved by etalamat wes laileted
The state insurance fund carries the ineur>
la coarse of private quarrel wttfe third party ancev and the Jurisdictional facts are admit*
(Corns. Laws l«U 7, | SI 12).
ted, except that it is contended by the degfldonco In compensation proceadinia for fendants that tho injury received by WilkerInjury to read employee operatinf grader aeid son for which be claims compensation was
to sustain finding that gunshot wound was re*
carved hi course of scufle with a traveler on the not the result of an accident arising out of or
highway, rotating to a nutter not connected in the course of his employment On the othwith dshnantfs employmentt under Comp. Laws er hand, it la oontendad by the applicant that
the injury did occur BM the result of an and*
1917,1*112.
2. Masto sad servant e>*37S<l)-£»sleyee dent arising in the course of his employment;
gradieg read who eeeaaed fa altareatlea with This is the only question to he determined.
The following findings of fact and concluthird peraes oaeeoraiof aerseeaf oriovaaco
held aet entitled ta cewpsaaatlea for weaad sion found by the commission reflects the
from ethers gas (Coma, Laws iai7 9 1 SI 12). commission's view of the evidence and are of
Kssployee engaged fat grading road* who sufficient importance to Justify quoting them
temporarily left his employment to engage in an at length:
sltereatien with a traveler en the highway eon* ['That on July 2fc 1927, at about 10*0 a. nu
earning a persons! grievance unrelated to mat- anpBcant was driving a grader east on the Oolters connected with his employment, and who tott-Ducheane highway, and WflMam Allen, anfas the course of scuffle received afcuashotwound other employee of the road coatinieelon, waa opfrom the ether's gun, Asa* not entitled to com- erating the grader; that as they were appensation, sines injury was not indicted because
along the left aide of the road throw*
of the employment as required by Gonsp. Lsws proaching
ing a swath of gravel to the lower aide at a poms
lM7,|3ra»
about two aftee west of the Bamberger monuml«nt, Mary Leveland and Frank Both aptho Workmen's
proached from the east; traveling west; that
poneaHosi Act by J. U WBkereon, opposed by afftteant had made a tarn at a curve about
the Indnstrlal Cofitmission of Utah and oth- 150 feet back of where the car waa met; thai
ana, Froaa an award -denying plaintiff's sp» -.Hi waatposeffale fee the applicant end Wiffiani
-
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M3km2 who vert oe the trader, to tee the ep- [1] While there la a conflict In the evidence
meedMac car far a distance of approximately aa to aomh of the facta found by the commisR00 feet; that aa the car approached the grad- sion, tM findings, In our opinion* are amply
er, ajfolleaat i m m hie horeea to the right sustained] There ia evidence to the effect
scrota the toad aad stopped them, thue torn- that when the grader and the car met on the
atoteU btocklag the car from paeaiag to the
right jwhtle the grader hlochtd paeeage to the highway both were on the same aide of the
left: 1 that applicant threw the Hnee down, road; that Wilkeraon turned hie horsea to
walked arooad the team* went up to the car and the right Sobetructing the entire width of the
started te heat Roth, who wae sitting hi the road so that the car could not paaa on either
ear; that la defending bimeelf Roth reached on* aide; thai he dropped the rein* of the horses,
der the eeat and got hold of a gun* and daring descended from the grader and went to the
the taisulag struggle shot applicant in the right aide of the car where Roth aat in the front
thigh*] the bullet ranging downward and freetorted the lower third of the right femur; that eeat and commenced to fight him; that thia
applicant fell on the running hoard and rolled off continued! until Roth obtained his gun, which
late the road at the same time calling to Roth waa undefr the eeat; timt Roth fired the gun
not~t4 ehoot him again; that Mar/ foreland* either intentionally, or that It accidentally
who wae driving the car* got oat and went to went off In the scuffle. It ia Immaterial for
Wlftereoa to help him; that William Allen, who the porpoee of thia case whether It waa inwo* at the grader wheel,«had got down from the tentional or accidental* The sole question here
graded aad started arooad to the car when the is, Waa the injury to Wilkeraon the reault of
ahot waa ired; that he did not hear any conrareatioa or see what transpired at the car, his an accident arising In the couree of his emvision] beiag obscured by the team; that when ployment? The foregoing la the substance of
AQaWmt arooad in front of the team where the evidence relating to the altercation, aa
he could see what had happened, he waa instruct* given by Mary Loveiand and Prank Roth. It
ad by] applicant to straighten up the teim and appears also from the evidence that there
i pass; that he did so and Roth drore by, waa ill feeling between Wilkeraon and Roth.
the car, picked op Mary Lords nd, and The undisputed evidence show* that only a
ded toward Oelton; that Wllkeraoa waa few day* before the occurrence hereinbefore
into a stage coach which had driven detailed Wilkeraon went at night to the houae
ap **$ taken to his home near the Bamberger where Roth waa stopping and sent for Roth
artaumeet; that Dr. Melrose, of Price, was
car, and that
called land gart treatment; that Wnkeraon waa to come out to Wllkerson's
M
M
heapltjrfsed la the Price City Hospital and waa Wilkeraon naked, Where la my still ; that
Roth
said
he
did
not
know;
that
Wlllkerson
ceafiaed there op to and including the date on
which the hearing in thia case was held; that called him a vile name and threatened'to kill
Pranh Roth had lived ia the same vicinity in him; that Wilkeraon Jumped out of the car
Carbon county aa applicant for something over and hit Roth with n^rock and continued to
a yeei and at times had worked for applicant, throw rocks at him until ^pth got into the
| which time he fired at applicant's home; houae; that Roth had not seen Wllke. ^
: other times he visited applicant and his after that until they met on the
aad stayed with them aa a guest for a Roth stated that the rock hit him j
i at a time; that preceding the incident
Coltoit-Dueheene road, at which time ahoul&er; and it waa not veil at
rounded the applicant, some ill feelings of the hearing. Wilkeraon admitted
part of WQkeraon developed; and that had had trouble with Roth before.
aboutjfive days prior to said shooting the sp- Both had been staying at hia houae i
in company with his brother-in-law, he left Wilkeraon lost a gun; that wh
went by automobile one night to the Loveland met Roth on the road he intended to
Roth waa staying and called Roth him about the goat that ha had never 1
*at of the houae; that Roth went out to the chance before. WQkeraon denied that
4er* that applicant demanded of Roth to tell fought Roth when they met on the road, i
his stfll waa; that Both denied
r of its wheeeeboata, whereupon appli- Insisted that Roth ahot him without provocaF i to abase Roth and throw missiles at tion. Be stated that ho tried t* take the can
aim, one of weir* struck him on the shoulder, aa from Rojh but waa unsuccessful -•
* result of which Roth's arm waa partly c*a>
The foregoing la the substance of the eviattends* the time of the hearing of thia
dence tnjon which the oommiaskm based ita
findings of fax* and conefnakme.
[2] Tbfe Injury to Wilkeraon waa caused hy
*Fj*/jriew of the forogoiag facta, the comnris* a third person concerning matters In no manefodt* that J. Lam WOkeraoa waa inJuly 20,1987, by being ahot bj* Prank ner connected with the employment The
kt the time and pice alleged in the ap- Industrial Act undertakes to protect the cm*
, — J m ; that Rath, who inflicted the j injury, ployee tit certain casee where the) injury la
waa althird party; and that the injury fas not caused hy a third person, hot tt It only where
applicant because of hie employ* the htjofrr k Inflicted heeane* of the empte*
that it reaaitad from causae entirely meal. Compiled Lawa TJtah 1MT> | S U * proapart from hie onmloymont and vide*:
i of a personal grievance e£
-The wards 'osteons! tefrry hy aortdatit ariaBoth, and thai
lag « * * and ia the teniae at
he
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be met I£ therefore, unlawful claims are; Uon obtain the proper relief in a court of
paid out of the fund the rate of premium* Justice. Other instance* readily suggest
mutt necessarily be ralaed to the extent of themselves to the reader which need not be
such demands, and therefore any contribu- specially mentioned. The mere fact, there*
tor may question the lawfulness of any fore, that the commission la made adminisaward either In whole or in part Nor la It trator and guardian of the fund is no obnecessary under the statute that he contest stacle in the way of any one who I* interest*
the original application for compensation. ed therein to defend i t The difficulty that
He may assume that the commission will presents Itself In this case, however, 1* that
comply with the law. Indeed, in case an the attorneys who claim to appear in the
award is merely excessive and not wholly name of the insurance fund and who assail
illegal, no one can complain until after the the lawfulness of the award have shown no
award is made and announced. The em* interest In the fund whatever. Having no
ployee who la permanently disabled and who interest they cannot be affected by the award,
is interested in having the insurance fund and hence cannot question it. As before
maintained is likewise interested not to have stated, while the extent or degree of Interest
the fund depleted by any award which is is not material, yet there must at least be
either * holly or partially unauthorized by some substantial Interest, or the party comlaw. As a matter of course the degree or plaining here ha* and can have no standing
extent of the interest so long as It Is a sub- in this court. In view, therefore, that the
stantial one is not material. Therefor^ either employer does not assail the lawfulness of
the contributing employer or the permanent* the award, and in view that there i s no one
\y disabled employee may (tx the name of who la Interested In the insurance fond and
the insurance fund question the lawfulness of hence haa the right to question the lawfulthe award. Such is the manifest purpose ness of the award, is here complaining, the
of the statute, and, in view that it must be award should be affirmed. In that respect
'lone In the same proceeding and within the this case* however, does not differ from any
time provided by statute, no one can be in other case where no good reason is made to
Jured and no one can complain. If, however, appear why an award of the commission
the opinion as now written shall prevail to should not be affirmed.
the effect that no one can defend an assault No valid cause being shown wherein the
upon the insurance fund except the commis- award Is not lawfuL it necessarily follows
sion, ihe fund must necessarily go omlefend* that it should be* affirmed, with costs,
rd in erery Instance where, as here, the com" mission has made an award payable out of
that fund. As before pointed out the commission has then already passed upon the GARFF v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH. <Ne. 44080
lawfulness of the award, and hence even if
it were possible for it in its own name to
(Supreme Court of Utah* Jane 10, 1026.)
assail itself in this court it would not do so.
and the fund would not and could not hare Master ass4 senrsat «s»40S44).
any defender.
Evidence that deputy sheriff was not in
performance of bis duties as officer at time of
In this connection it may not be out of place altercation and injury A«fd to support Industo suggest that even in the absence Uf the trial Commission** finding denying compensaenabling statute it would not be Irregular tion, in view of Comp, Law* 1017, f 3112, s*
' to permit 'an Intereated party to question the amended by Laws 1021, e* fi7.
unlawfulness of an award. The mere fact
Action by A. Z. Garff to review an order of
that the commission la made the administrator and guardian thereof certainly cannot the Industrial Commission denying an award
prevent one who is interested la it from de- of compensation. Order of Commission affending It There are many Instances where firmed.
those whd are charged with the administraHolmgren. Anderson 4 Russell, of Salt
tion of a£ estate or a fund who by reason Lake City, for plaintiff.
of some Act of theirs become adversely InHarvey H. Oluff, Atty. Gem And J. Robert
terested dr hare by their conduct become im- Robinson, AasL Atty, Gen., for defendant
proper pefsone to defend the right* of the in*
terested {forties* A familiar instance of that „ Gli>BUN. a J. TM* is an action to review
kind whick frequently occura arises where the an order of the Industrial Commission deny*
directors and officers of a corporation who lag the plaintiff, Garff, compensation. The
are charged with the duty of managing its commission made the following finding:
affairs arid to protect its rlghta and the right*
of the atbckhqldera by reason of their acta "There is ae] question regarding the fact that
and conduct become disqualified from actio* applicant, Mr. Garff, and lflr. Vera Enais had a
eti the tfta day of Hay, 1925, and as a
In such event any stockholder or creditor who fight
result of said tight Mr. Garff was serioaefr fan
Is tntAfMM M f t In thm Bimi ftf thm M M M M .
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dat« of thl* assault there hidJbeen ill feelings | Ennis and his companion, that he had some
between Mr. Garff and Mr. Entile by reason of I reason to suspect'that Mr. Ennis was engaged
Mr. GarTs eetray cattle gettinglato Mr. Ennla* in the bootlegging tfbalness, and that he was
pea patcb and doing damage. We find that Mr. of the opinion that Mr. Ennis was st that
Garff, on the 17th day of May! 1925 (Sunday), time setting ready to make a delivery of inwaa not attempting to arrest Mr. Emus for an
alleged violation of the prohibition law. We toxicating liquor to some one. Mr. Cosgrove
find that the difficulty arose over a personal testified that as Mr. Garff approached the car
dispute between the applicant and Mr. Ennis, where Mr. Ennis was standing he said, "111
relating entirely to Mr. Qarffa cattle, and that have to place you boys' under arrest" Mr.
the assault was occasioned bV personal eon- Garff did not testify as to the language used,
troveray indulged In between Mr. Gsrff, the apsaid he was attempting to make an arrest
plicant and Mr. Ennis, and that, at the time Mr. hut
Gsrff waa injured by reason [of said assault, On the other hand, Mr. Ennis testified that as
he waa not in fact engaged in performing any Mr. Garff approached him he made this stateduty for his-employer. Salt Lake County, t i l ment: "Tern Ennis, you dirty little bastard,
you have got to take back everything you
deputy sheriff/*
said to me out in the field or there will be
From the foregoing finding the commission trouble." It is not testified to by any one that
concluded that the Applicant Jvaa not entitled anything further was said about an arrest
after these introductory statements. Other
to compensation.
It la insisted on the port of plaintiff before witnesses testified that there was conversathis court that there is no'competent sub* tion between the parties,'but that they were
stantial evidence in the record to support the not in such proximity to the participants as
commission's finding. It la conceded that, if to be able to understand what was said. As
there is substantial competent evidence In a result of the fight, Mr. Garff was seriously
the record to support the commission's find- injured, as found by the commission.
The commission made no finding on the
ings, this court ia powerless to review such
controverted issue as to whether the plaintiff,
finding.
It appears that a fight occurred i>ctween Mr. Garff, waa actually a deputy sheriff at
Garff and Ennis on May 17,1025. It likewise the time in question or hot It la, however,
appears these parties reside near each other fairly lnferam| from the commission's findat or near Draper, in Salt Lake county; that ings tost the commission was of the opinion
a few days prior to the 17th day of May, that the testimony was sufficient to support a
1925, Mr. GarfTs cattle had trespassed upon finding that Garff was a deputy sheriff at
the premises of Mr. Ennis and had done some that particular time. That, however, is fan*
material, unless he received the injury by
damage to his pea crop.
It is the contention of plaintiff that he was reason of "the willful act of a third person
a deputy sheriff on May 17,1025, and that he directed against" him "because of his employwas attempting to make an arrest when he ment" or by reason of his office. If the testi*
was assaulted by Ennis. He claims compen- mony of Mr. Ennis Is to be believed, then the
sation by reason of the fact that in the dis- plaintiff was not In the discharge of any duty
charge of his duties as deputy sheriff the as* imposed upon him by reason of his employ*
sault was made and the injury resulted. He ment • The plaintiff was either attempting to
relies) upon subdivision 5 of section 3112, make an arrest at that time or he was not
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, as amended by chap- If he was not, he was not engaged In the perter 67, LAWS Utah 1021. That subdivision formance of his duties as a public officer, and
therefore the accident or injury did not arise
reads:
out of his employment or In the course of his
"Hie words "personal injury by accident
arising out of or In the coarse of employment* employment Just what the plaintiff was atshall include an injury caused by the willful act tempting to do must be determined from what
of a third person directed againat an employee was said and (lone by the parties at the time*
Mr. Ennis, after stating what Mr. Garff aaid
because of his employment • • • "
to him when he first approached the automoThe controversy and troulle between Mr. bile where Ekinls was standing, testified that
Garff and Mr. Bnnia took pilace In front of he in reply- smld: "Welt my God, Aaron, I
the tetter's home on the morning of May 17, thought that was settled. You came to me
1925. It appears that on the,'morning of that and got your cows, and I thought that was
day Mr. Ennis and a Mr. Cosgrove drove from settled." Later on this same witness testified
the village of Draper to Mr. Ennis* premises that he said to Mr. Garff:. "This is no way to
in separate automobiles. According to the settle UiU; I didn't ceil you a thief.* Headtestimony i f Mr. Ennla, hef had asked Mr. so testified that la reply to what he said to
Cosgrove to assist him in lifting a colt from Mr. Garff, Garff said; "Ton aneaklng little
a ditch into which It had falieW Immediately bastard," and with that struck Mr. Ennis In
after they kopped in front of the house and the mouth with his fist Tnls, Mr. Garff debarn of Mr. Ennis, Mr. Garff came along in, nies this testimony, hut !» the face of the
his automobile, driving westward- It is the testimony given b* Mr. Amis, bo* can it reatestimony of Mr. Garff that h* stopped there sonably he defused* as In dainsed by counsel
for the purpose of making i n arrest of Mr. for ptoiutiff, that there ts no auhstsnttat erf
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lence to support the commission's finding} 3. Larossy $ » ! •
The only question of fact serious!/ contrtw
Erideace of receiving stole* goods know*
rerted In the case was whether the plalntllt, tog them to have been so stolen does not supOarff, was risking or attempting to make an port larceny charge.
srrest by virtue of the fact that he was the*^
aud at that time a deputy sheriff. The test*, 4» Larossy * a * 8 ( 3 ) .
In prosecution for larceny «f sutomoblle,
mony which we hare quoted was given to eni
Labllsh what was said and done at the pertly evidence ss to whether property had been re*
cently stolen within Com* Laws 1917, | 8285,
alar time that Garff claims he was attempt- Md for Jury*
luff to make an arrest The commission
found that he was not In the discharge of h i , 5. Lareeay <t=>«8(3).
In prosecution for larceny ef automobile,
duties as an officer at that time. The commit*
sion further found that the difficulty between evidence hM not to explain possession of acthe plaintiff and Mr. Ennle Was a person*} cused nnder Comp. Laws 1917,14285, as matdispute relating entirely t o GarlTs cattle ter of law, but question to be for Jury.'
having trespassed upon Ennis* growing crop%(
6. Lareesy <*=»W
and that the quarrel resulted from such tre*.
Evidence Uid sufficient to sustain conviction
pass, and that the assault was occasioned by
a personal controversy. There can be n 0 for larceny of automobile.
doubt that there Is substantial competent 7. Crimiaal taw cs*23(IO)—tastrtetiea t i l l
proof In the record to support the commit
possession of property rsoestly stelea Is
slon's findings. I t is useless to cite authors
prima faeie evUeace ef stilt, la ahessoe sf
MHIkrtory sxnJasaiJes, bald sot srrer, Is
tie* /2Mf tb)s ivi?Tt Is rrltboot pt>wer t>r rJgkt
view ef other iastrsetloss (Camp* Laws »9!7f
to review findings of the commission If suc^
| 8285).
findings are supported by any competent, sutC
Instruction, , under Comp. JMWM 1917, |
stantlnl proof in the record. It Is likewise
8285,
that poisession ef property recently stoluseless to consider the^cases which c o a n ^
for plaintiff cites discussing the question Of en is deemed prims fade evidence of gmlt of
larceny, in absence of satisfactory explanation,
what is and whafc4a-not substantial evidence held not erroneous, in view of explanation by
The testimony of what took place at the tlm^ court of meaning and effect of statute so as to
of this troubte»turely cannot be considered a* make dearer to jury that conviction must be
without substance In attempting to prove an$ on all evidence, and only when convinced of
establish whether the plaintiff, Garff, wns s e t guilt beyond ressonsble doubt.'
tling a personal grievance or was attempting
8. Criminal law *=>829(I5).
to enforce the law.
Refusal of Instruction upon force ana enact
The order of the commission denying th*
of circumstantial evidence and Its proper con*
awardjs affirmed.
•{deration by Jury **Jrf not error, where court
THUBMAN, FRIOIL, uiiLiuu, ati* correctly stated law thereon to extent that secured was-entitled.
STRAUP, JJ n concur.
9. Criminal law *$»5S2(3).
To warrant conviction, circumstantial aridence must convince jury beyond reasonmble
8TATE v. MERRITT.
doubt that all facts and circumstances are true,
• and surit incompatible with any reasonable hy(Supreme Court of Utah.
f p a t W a o t h e r thin guilt of accused.
I. Criminal law * » 9 6 8 ( 4 )
Jurisdictional question in criminal prose.
fWCftaiMtar
cutlon is properly raised by m o t i o n ^ kxfafi*tf
' Alleged
*ti—-Ji error
— la failure "to instruct cmicerning good character of accused under evi*
Judgment.
4$&ce cannot be considered, where no such fa*
2. indict meat sad Intormailea <$•£$*,-5 t < 2 ) - j struction waa requested nor question raised by
Depsty district attiraey la « ^ | * * £ * b L^tiginieitt of error.
Information, and Mi ileslSf as> s S s f r t f l ^ t t t r ^ f ^
aey Is mere Iri^siarity, W t lsva|ls*ari^r l«% *f, Criminal law «3=»9gg(S)-ftef*saJ ef
formation (Coma. Laws 191)1 U 57«r,*7*V > trial, seagirt seen afleaVtts relating ttf
- Jy dissevered evidanee ef aliW, bet* mat,
j In view of CompjLaws lTOT^H
&JZ*TO '; ef elseretiea, la view ef eesster cMaHtsu
8811, 8878, deputy district aitorn>?y la autnorl /~V<iMonel of new trials sought upon aflda*
ised to subscribe end He inforataieu, notwitlaC vita relating to newty discovered evidence* seek*
standing sections 5761, 5763, and 877% and ni* ing to establish, alibi which did not occur to ac«
signing as district attorney Is mere trreguUri„*| cuSedfuntil after trial, h*U not abuse e l disty, which doss not invalidate Information:*
ctatieai In view of cetmjtar affidavits eontr*<jlcting alibi theory.
* State v„ Badde, IS
m. «* r. is; BUU $
Murray. It tftaa. m ,
< Sgtata v, OmtTetes, « V t & HV* T. ISIS; IUUuh.X7f.MP. U1S;
tlagiilsalsg 9Ute v. Foully m TJIalu eX US K ISSt,
lit P. S8S.
*l|MUe «* Banwtta* Sf UtaX m. m *. UL
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